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Victim Compensation Funds and Tort
Litigation Following Incidents of Mass
Violence
PAUL HEATON†
IVAN WAGGONER
JAMIE MORIKAWA
INTRODUCTION
How do victim compensation funds (VCFs) impact a
victim’s likelihood to sue using the tort system? This issue is
of more than theoretical interest, as VCFs have become a
seemingly ubiquitous feature of the policy landscape
following high-profile tragedies. For example, following the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress created a
special compensation fund for victims who waived their right
to sue.1 After being swarmed with thousands of donations in
the wake of the Virginia Tech massacre, Virginia Tech
established the Hokie Spirit Memorial Fund to provide
† Paul Heaton (pheaton@rand.org) is a senior fellow at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, 3501 Sansom St., Philadelphia, PA 19104, and an
adjunct economist at the RAND Corporation, Jamie Morikawa
(morikawa@rand.org) is a researcher and Ivan Waggoner (waggoner@rand.org)
an adjunct researcher at the RAND Corporation, 1776 Main St. Santa Monica CA,
90407. The research was supported though RAND’s Institute for Civil Justice
(ICJ) core funding program, which pools contributions from a diverse set of
sources with differing perspectives on the civil justice system, including
corporations, foundations, individuals, plaintiff and defense-oriented law firms,
and trade and professional associations. We gratefully acknowledge a number of
individuals who helped to improve this research, including Ken Feinberg, whose
thoughtful conversations on VCFs provided an impetus for the research, and
James Anderson, Lloyd Dixon, Steve Garber, Gillian Hadfield, Angela Hung,
Malini Moorthy, and Nick Pace who offered helpful comments on drafts. Kent
Burbank was instrumental in providing information about the Tucson Together
Fund, and Diana Malouf did an outstanding job administering our survey.
Responsibility for this Article rests solely with the authors and its content does
not necessarily reflect the views of the ICJ or its supporters.
1. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 405(c)(3)(B)(i), 115 Stat. 230, 239-40 (2001).
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monetary compensation to victims.2 Victims of the Aurora,
Colorado movie theater shooting received payments from a
VCF,3 as did victims in the Sandy Hook Elementary School
shooting4 and the Boston Marathon bombing.5 BP paid out
more than $6.2 billion to over 220,000 claims through its Gulf
Coast Claims Facility, a private compensation fund it
established in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.6
Even prior to 9/11, funds were established for victims of the
Columbine High School shooting and the Oklahoma City
bombing.
VCFs exist in parallel to—or in some cases, as with the
9/11 Fund, as a substitute for—the tort system, which
remains the apex source of compensation for victims of
personal injury. While a small body of empirical scholarly
research on VCFs has emerged in recent years, much of the
foundational work regarding how such funds affect behavior
of victims, their legal representatives, and current and
potential tortfeasors remains undone.
One particular gap in scholarly understanding of VCFs
concerns how such funds affect victims’ attitudes towards,
and their willingness to engage in, tort litigation. Because
existing empirical research on VCFs has been primarily
retrospective—focusing on the amount of compensation
provided by funds and whether participants were satisfied
with their experience—we know little about how the
particular characteristics of a VCF contribute to its ultimate
success or failure. For example, does the mere existence of a
fund alter people’s calculations about whether to pursue
litigation, how much to seek in compensation, and from
2. We Remember, VA. TECH., http://www.vt.edu/fund (last visited Oct. 19,
2015).
3. Kayla Arneson, Feinberg Finalizes Payments from Aurora Victim Relief
Fund, COMMUNITY FIRST (Nov. 16, 2012), http://communityfirstfoundation.org/
news/news-releases/feinberg-finalizes-payments-from-aurora-victim-relief-fund.
4. Who We Are, NEWTOWN-SANDY HOOK
http://www.nshcf.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).

COMMUNITY

FOUND.,

INC.,

5. About the One Fund, ONE FUND BOS., https://secure.onefundboston.org/
pages/about (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).
6. BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS
FACILITY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/
resources/697201241917226179477.pdf.
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whom, or is a fund only as good as the amount of
compensation it provides? Are there particular contexts
where funds are more likely to shift attitudes towards tort
litigation? Answers to these questions might help
policymakers decide whether to establish a VCF following a
particular event as well as guide fund structure and design.
Nonetheless, empirical data illuminating these questions
remains elusive.
In this Article, we provide novel evidence on the
relationship between VCFs and tort litigation, drawing from
a nationally representative survey of 1558 adult respondents.
Our survey presents a hypothetical scenario where a mass
shooting at a concert injures a friend or family member of the
respondent. We experimentally vary whether a VCF exists
following the shooting, the amount of loss, and the amount of
compensation provided, allowing us to examine how these
attributes of a situation affect decisions regarding whether to
pursue litigation, and whom to sue. We also collected a
substantial amount of qualitative information from our
survey respondents, which permits us to better gauge the
reasons why some respondents choose not to sue, and more
clearly understand how VCFs shape attitudes towards tort
recovery.
A key virtue of our survey approach is that it allows us
to draw inferences about how changing characteristics of a
VCF would alter behavior holding other factors constant.
Obtaining such conclusions would be close to impossible with
real-world data, since it would essentially require several
factually identical mass shootings with different types of
VCFs. To buttress our experimental findings, and to assess
whether our experimental findings are likely to translate to
the real world, we also carefully examined published
accounts of victim behavior following a number of recent
mass tragedies involving actual VCFs.
Our experimental survey reveals that VCFs can play an
important role in shaping decisions to pursue litigation in the
wake of a tragedy. In particular, we demonstrate that in our
mass injury scenario: (1) litigation is less likely when a VCF
provides compensation to victims, even when such
compensation does not require waiving one’s right to sue; (2)
the amount of compensation provided by the VCF matters;
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(3) adequacy of compensation is measured relative to
economic loss, rather than in absolute terms; (4) a
substantial fraction of the population would pursue a suit
even when fully compensated for economic loss; and (5) VCFs
affect decisions regarding whether to sue, but not whom to
sue. We also show that a modest but non-negligible subset of
the population express an unwillingness to pursue a suit
even following a significant uncompensated loss, and that
several demographic characteristics predict willingness to
pursue a suit.
Our qualitative analysis reveals factors beyond
compensation that can affect victims’ willingness to pursue
litigation. Many who receive partial compensation from the
VCF cite the costs and hassles of litigation as a deterrent to
further pursuing a suit. Others who receive compensation,
but still want to sue, express concern about latent injuries or
potential future unforeseen costs, or focus on ensuring that
responsible parties are held accountable and adequately
punished. These findings are consistent with prior
theoretical work on tort that focuses on the variety of
functions played by the tort system beyond simple provision
of compensation. Ultimately, our findings suggest that VCFs
are an imperfect substitute for litigation given that people
see tort law as more than just a means to compensation.
There are, however, certain circumstances where VCFs may
be effective at reducing some litigation
Part I provides an overview of the existing research on
VCFs, and briefly outlines some of the theoretical work on
the tort system relevant for our Study. Part II discusses our
survey platform, the American Life Panel, and considers the
strengths and limitations of survey data in this context.
Part III presents our results. We first provide a quantitative
analysis of our survey responses, including an analysis of
how VCF characteristics and respondent demographics
influence decisions regarding whether and whom to sue. We
next turn to the qualitative data to help us better explain
respondents’ decisions. Finally, we compare what we learned
from the survey with actual observed behavior of victims
receiving payments from VCFs. Finally, the Article concludes
by discussing the policy implications of our findings.
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I. EXISTING RESEARCH ON VCFS AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO TORT LITIGATION
Although there has been considerable theoretical and
empirical work examining administrative alternatives to tort
such as workers’ compensation,7 vaccine compensation
funds,8 and no-fault auto insurance,9 there has been less
scholarly work examining the attributes and impacts of
compensation funds established in the wake of one-time mass
injury events such as terrorist events or shootings. Much of
the recent scholarly work on VCFs has centered on the first
9/11 VCF, with a handful of studies providing some data on
the interplay between the 9/11 Fund and the tort system.10 In
7. See, e.g., Richard J. Butler, Lost Injury Days: Moral Hazard Differences
Between Tort and Workers’ Compensation, 63 J. RISK & INS. 405 (1996); D. Han
Chang, Workers’ Compensation for Occupational Disease: Prorating Liability
Versus Last Employer Liability, 60 J. RISK & INS. 647 (1993); Jean C. Love, Actions
for Nonphysical Harm: The Relationship Between the Tort System and No-Fault
Compensation (With an Emphasis on Workers’ Compensation), 73 CALIF. L. REV.
857 (1985); W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Workers’ Compensation: Wage
Effects, Benefit Inadequacies, and the Value of Health Losses, 69 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 249 (1987).
8. See, e.g., Gemma Flamberg, An Experiment in Tort Reform: The National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986, 110 PUB. HEALTH REP. 635,
635 (1995).
9. See, e.g., JAMES ANDERSON ET AL., RAND CORP., THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH
NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A RETROSPECTIVE (2010); DAVID LOUGHRAN,
RAND CORP., THE EFFECTS OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE ON DRIVER BEHAVIOR AND
AUTO ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2001); Gary T. Schwartz, Auto No-Fault
and First Party Insurance: Advantages and Problems, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 611
(2000).
10. In addition to the empirical studies discussed here, there have been a
number of theoretical studies of the 9/11 Fund and other VCFs. See, e.g., Robert
M. Ackerman, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective
Administrative Response to National Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 135
(2005); Elizabeth Berkowitz, The Problematic Role of the Special Master:
Undermining the Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund,
24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2006); Martha Chamallas, The September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund: Rethinking the Damages Element in Injury Law, 71 TENN.
L. REV. 51 (2003); John G. Culhane, Tort, Compensation, and Two Kinds of
Justice, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1027 (2003); Erin G. Holt, The September 11 Victim
Compensation Fund: Legislative Justice Sui Generis, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
513 (2003); Stephan Landsman, A Chance to Be Heard: Thoughts About
Schedules, Caps, and Collateral Source Deductions in the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL LAW REV. 393 (2003); Linda S. Mullenix,
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assessing how victims view compensation, Deborah R.
Hensler compared and contrasted comments made by 9/11
victims and members of the public in response to proposed
and finalized rules of the 9/11 VCF.11 She found that both
members of the public and 9/11 victims preferred a tort-like
compensation system based on economic loss, and not based
on victims’ needs or notions of equality.12 However, the
comments suggested victims compared their compensation to
others, and that those who received the most felt the result
was just, while those who received less felt morally slighted.13
Brian H. Borstein and Susan Posers’ first study on the
9/11 VCF supports Hensler’s results. Using a survey of 9/11
victims, Borstein and Poser used the novelty of the 9/11 VCF
to test theories of distributive justice.14 They found that the
more compensation victims received, the more they felt
compensation was fair, and that it was fair compared to what
others received.15 Overall, however, dissatisfaction among
9/11 VCF claimants was substantial.16
Two other studies share some similarities to our own, as
they pertain to how 9/11 victims evaluated the tradeoff
Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as a Means for Resolving
Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819 (2011); Linda S. Mullenix,
The Future of Tort Reform: Possible Lessons from the World Trade Center Victim
Compensation Fund, 53 EMORY L.J. 1315 (2004); George L. Priest, The
Problematic Structure of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 527 (2003); Robert I. Rabin, The September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund: A Circumscribed Response or an Auspicious Model?, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 769 (2003); Mike Steenson & Joseph Michael Sayler, The Legacy
of the 9/11 Fund and the Minnesota I-35W Bridge-Collapse Fund: Creating a
Template for Compensating Victims of Future Mass-Tort Catastrophes, 35 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 524 (2008).
11. Deborah R. Hensler, Money Talks: Searching for Justice through
Compensation for Personal Injury and Death, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 417, 432-51
(2003).
12. See id. at 453-55.
13. See id.
14. Brian H. Borstein & Susan Poser, Perceptions of Procedural and
Distributive Justice in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 17
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 75, 76-77 (2007).
15. Id. at 93.
16. Id. at 90-91.
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between compensation through a VCF and litigation. After
surveying and interviewing 9/11 victims, Gillian K. Hadfield
found the choice confronting 9/11 victims was not as easy as
weighing the probability of winning a judgment in court
against guaranteed, comparatively rapidly paid money from
the VCF.17 Many felt more were responsible than just the
terrorists, blaming the airline security firms, the Federal
Aviation Administration, intelligence agencies, and the
Immigration and
Naturalization Service.18
Among
respondents who chose the fund, many did so reluctantly.
Twenty-five percent of respondents were unsure if they had
made the right choice and 10% regretted their decision.19
More than half the respondents who chose the fund found the
decision to be difficult, often feeling as though they missed
an opportunity to seek accountability.20 Ultimately, Hadfield
suggests that such funds may not necessarily be an adequate
substitute for litigation.21
Bornstein and Poser offer several additional findings
that more or less corroborate Hadfield’s study. Using another
survey of 9/11 victims, they found some lingering doubts
amongst victims about whether taking compensation over
litigation was the right course.22 Twenty-nine percent of
respondents who chose the fund were unsure if they had
made the right choice and 7% felt they made the wrong
decision.23 Even among those who felt they made the right
choice by going with the fund, more than half felt they

17. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the
Courthouse: Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW &
SOC’Y REV., 645, 645 (2008).
18. Id. at 656-58.
19. Id. at 663.
20. See id. at 663-64.
21. See id. at 673-76.
22. Brian H. Bornstein & Susan Poser, Victims, Lawyers, and Money: Legal
Representation in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund 15 (Mar. 2010)
(unpublished paper), http://works.bepress.com/brian_bornstein/1.
23. Id. at 20.
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received less compensation than they would have if they had
successfully sued.24
Although this research on the 9/11 Fund provides some
indications as to how VCFs might affect attitudes towards
litigation—for example, highlighting the significant role that
the amount of compensation and the desire for accountability
played in victims’ decision-making process—it is unclear
whether the findings from the 9/11 Fund are likely to
generalize to other types of funds. The legislation creating
the 9/11 Fund gave victims a choice: litigation or VCF
compensation.25 Those who chose the VCF were eligible for
up to $8.5 million in compensation,26 but they waived their
right to sue.27 Those who chose litigation could only bring
their claim to the federal court of the Southern District of
New York, and damages were capped by the amount of
insurance carried at the time of the attacks by the defendant
airline.28 The 9/11 VCF thus differs from many of the other
VCFs that have arisen in the wake of mass injuries in that
(1) victims were required to waive the right to sue, (2) those
who did sue faced a tort process constrained by sui generis
federal statute, and (3) there was a substantial pool of
compensation money available relative to the number of
victims. In all, less than a hundred victims litigated the
matter29 and the VCF paid over $7 billion to 5562 people,
which included families of the deceased and those who
suffered physical injury.30
The present Study contrasts with this prior work in that
we employ an experimental survey-based research design
that allows us to measure how variations in the
24. Id.
25. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 405(c)(3)(B)(i), 115 Stat. 230, 240 (2001).
26. KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE
SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at 109 (2004),
http://www.justice.gov/final_report.pdf.
27. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i), 115 Stat. at 240.
28. Id. §408(a), (b)(3).
29. Hadfield, supra note 17, at 646.
30. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT
VICTIMS OF 9/11, at xi (2005).

TO COMPENSATE THE
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characteristics of a VCF influence expected behavior,
something that is not possible in the study of real-world
funds since fund characteristics are fixed. For real-world
funds, one cannot readily construct a counterfactual for how
individuals would have behaved had a fund not existed or
had different characteristics. In addition, our hypothetical
uses a VCF that exists alongside traditional tort litigation.
Unlike the 9/11 Fund, most of the VCFs that have been
established following mass shootings or tragedies
supplemented, rather than substituted for, tort litigation.
These prior studies on VCFs are embedded within a
larger theoretical literature examining the tort system that
is also relevant for the present Study. Although legal scholars
have advanced numerous competing approaches to
understanding the aims of tort law, two approaches currently
stand at the forefront of debate.31 The first portrays the
purpose of tort law as primarily a means to deter
economically wasteful activity.32 Damages are imposed to
incentivize potential wrongdoers to, in the future, “weigh the
costs of injury against the benefits of productive activity.”33
The second “corrective justice” perspective posits that tort
law’s aim is to “enforce[ ] duties of repair that arise in
response to wrongdoing.”34 Thus, where one party harms the
interests of another, the injurer must compensate the injured
in order to restore her to her pre-injury position.35
31. Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of
Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 193 (2000); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories
of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1801, 1801 (1997).
32. Richard A. Posner, Instrumental and Noninstrumental Theories of Tort
Law, 88 IND. L.J. 469, 469 (2013); Schwartz, supra note 31, at 1828.
33. Hensler, supra note 11, at 421.
34. Scott Hershovitz, Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists, 39 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 107, 108 (2011); see also Culhane, supra note 10, at 1069.
35. Culhane, supra note 10, at 1033. For additional examples of the framing of
tort law goals, consider George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22
VAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1987) (“The goals of modern law are reduction of the accident
rate and the provision of compensation to the injured. . . . [T]hese goals should
command widespread acceptance.”); Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the “Crisis”:
A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 765
(1987) (“Tort law’s primary function, this essay proposes, is not to compensate,
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While these theoretical perspectives shed some light on
the potential role of VCFs within the larger tort system, more
directly relevant for this Study is the following question:
What is the purpose of tort law from the viewpoint of actual
and potential consumers of the system? While the literature
on plaintiffs’ perception of tort goals is modest compared to
the volumes of legal scholarship on theories of tort, some
research and discussion on this topic exists.
In studies where plaintiffs are interviewed or surveyed
about their litigation objectives, they share narratives that
reflect their desire to pursue litigation on the basis of
strongly-held principles that are separate from, or exclusive
of, any desire for a financial recovery.36 For example, in a
study that evaluated plaintiffs’ motivation behind litigation
in medical malpractice cases, Tamara Relis indicated that
“‘It’s not about the money!’ was a common theme throughout
virtually all plaintiffs’ discourse. The issue of ‘principle’ was
prominent for plaintiffs as revealed in the various objectives
they passionately spoke about.”37 Apart from compensation,
plaintiffs may express a desire for acknowledgement of their
loss;38 wrongdoers to be held accountable for harm they have

deter, or punish, but rather to resolve disputes arising from perceived breaches of
important social norms, thereby reducing conflict and reaffirming those norms.”).
36. Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About The Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of
Plaintiff’s Litigation Aims, 68 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 342, 361 (2006).
37. Id. Even where money is an explicit objective of a plaintiff, money might
be viewed as a secondary rather than primary goal. See id. at 363. Compensation
can also symbolize “a means towards . . . nonmonetary ends,” Hensler, supra note
11, at 429, such ends being, for example, a signal that the plaintiff was “heard
and acknowledged or as a deterrent to future conduct.” Relis, supra note 36, at
378.
38. Relis, supra note 36, at 364 (describing a study where medical malpractice
plaintiffs’ objectives included obtaining physician acknowledgement of harm); see
also Liesbeth Hulst & Arno J. Akkermans, Can Money Symbolize
Acknowledgement? How Victims’ Relatives Perceive Monetary Awards for Their
Emotional Harm, 4 PSYCHOL. INJ. & L. 245, 252, 258 (2011).
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caused;39 an apology or admission of guilt from wrongdoers;40
information and answers;41 policy changes that would
prevent re-occurrences of the harm;42 and retribution or
39. Tom Tyler discusses a powerful example of plaintiffs’ desire for
accountability:
In 1990, Tom Durkin conducted a study that included in-depth
interviews with asbestos victims who already were involved in the civil
justice system[ ]. . . . Durkin found that . . . victims repeatedly expressed
a preference for adjudication. This preference was distinct from a desire
for compensation, however. It stemmed from a desire to face the asbestos
companies in court where the litigants could present evidence about their
harm and the court could make official findings of wrongdoing.
Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Settlement of Mass Tort Claims,
53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 199, 202-03 (1990) (citing Tom Durkin, The Settlement
of Asbestos Claims in the United States and United Kingdom (1990) (working
paper) (Am. Bar Found.); see also Hadfield, supra note 17, at 661 (quoting one
9/11 plaintiff who framed the decision to pursue litigation as a “duty to pursue
those responsible for [her] loss in court.”); Hensler, supra note 11, at 427-28; Sally
Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the
Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 151, 153 (1984) (arguing that by the time
parties turn from interpersonal discussion and negotiation to third party or court
intervention, “the grievant wants vindication . . . , an advocate to help in the
battle, or a third party who will uncover the ‘truth’ and declare the other party
wrong.”); Relis, supra note 36, at 364.
40. Relis, supra note 36, at 363-64, 379. For example, one plaintiff whose
mother was injured in a fall at a hospital described the decision to sue: “The whole
reason for all of this is, as we said to our lawyer was ‘[m]y mother needed an
apology.’ ‘That’ is what this is about: the mistakes and no apology, nothing.” Id.
at 378; see also Hulst & Akkermans, supra note 38, at 252, 258.
41. In Relis’ 2006–2007 study, “‘obtaining answers or explanations’ about what
happened was the second most repeated litigation objective of plaintiffs” in her
dataset of claimants who filed medical malpractice suits. Relis, supra note 36, at
365. Similarly, in deciding whether or not to accept payment from the September
11th Victim Compensation Fund or file a lawsuit, respondents in Hadfield’s study
who decided to sue identified as a consideration their desire for information
obtainable through the litigation process. Hadfield, supra note 17, at 661-62; see
also Hensler, supra note 11, at 417 (depicting victims’ “need to understand why
this happened” as a familiar refrain); Merry & Silby, supra note 39, at 153
(describing grievant’s desire to “uncover the ‘truth’”); Tamara Relis, Civil
Litigation from Litigants’ Perspectives: What We Know and What We Don’t Know
About the Litigation Experience of Individual Litigants, 25 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y
151, 155 (2002).
42. In fact, preventing the wrong from happening again ranked at the top
(along with admission of fault) among the respondents in Relis’ 2006–2007 study
examining medical malpractice plaintiffs’ litigation objectives. Relis, supra note
36, at 363 fig.4. Similarly, in Hadfield’s study, respondents who faced the decision
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punishment.43 These varied goals reflect the fact that
“litigants are propelled into litigation as a result of not only
material but also psychological and emotional needs to
alleviate the effects of distressing experiences. Hence, their
aims often include non-monetary elements.”44
A VCF’s impact on a victim’s willingness to sue might
depend, at least in part, on the VCF’s ability to meet the nonmonetary goals of plaintiffs. Therefore, our research, along
with other studies on VCFs, should be understood within the
context of the broader literature addressing the purpose of
tort law and plaintiffs’ perception of tort law’s aims. Such
scholarship is instructive as we analyze the responses
received through our survey.
II. DATA
To better measure how VCF payments affect attitudes
towards litigation, we fielded an original experimental
survey of a nationally representative group of U.S. adults.
The survey was conducted in August 2013 using the
American Life Panel (ALP), an Internet-based survey
platform developed by the RAND Corporation. ALP
participants include about 6000 individuals over the age of
eighteen who are compensated for regularly participating in
web-based research surveys.45 RAND recruits ALP
participants in a variety of ways, most notably from among
participants in other prominent national surveys involving

between payout from the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund or pursuit
of litigation believed that suing could give them the chance to promote change
through the courts. Hadfield, supra note 17, at 649, 662.
43. Relis, supra note 36, at 363 fig.4. “Only rarely do these accounts show us
vengeful plaintiffs. But occasionally plaintiffs . . . describ[e] their desire to hurt
defendants, as they have been hurt.” Hensler, supra note 11, at 429 (footnote
omitted). Parties also may seek to “use litigation as a coercive weapon.” Relis,
supra note 41, at 156.
44. Relis, supra note 41, at 193; see also Relis, supra note 36, at 341, 360-61,
382-83.
45. RAND CORP., RAND AM. LIFE PANEL 1 (2015), http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/corporate_pubs/CP500/CP508-2015-05/RAND_CP5082015-05.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).
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random selection.46 To further minimize selection bias,
laptops and internet access are provided to those who lack
such capabilities.47 Since panel members are paid, response
rates are usually high.48 For this Study, the survey was
completed by 1558 randomly selected participants from the
ALP.
Our experimental survey incorporates two particular
features that allow us to better assess how the existence and
characteristics of VCFs affect attitudes towards pursuing
litigation following a mass-injury event. First, we randomly
assign respondents to different versions of the survey,
altering across survey versions the amount of loss
experienced during the injury, whether a VCF exists to
provide injury compensation, and the amount of
compensation provided by the VCF. A key virtue of
randomization in this context is that it allows us to attribute
differences in expressed attitudes towards litigation to
variation in the particular situations presented across
variants of the survey, rather than other factors. For
example, it seems reasonable to expect that answers
regarding whether to pursue litigation are influenced by
unobservable individual characteristics such as attitudes
towards the legal profession, prior experience with litigation,
or assumptions regarding information not explicitly provided
in the text of the question. However, randomization provides
confidence that these unobserved factors are unlikely to
differ systematically across respondents to the different
versions of the survey. Second, we allow participants to
provide free-form explanations for their answers regarding
whether and whom to sue. These responses provide a wealth
of qualitative information about attitudes towards litigation
and how these attitudes change based upon the available
forms of compensation.

46. See id.; Recruitment, RAND AM. LIFE PANEL, https://alpdata.rand.org/
index.php?page=panelcomposition (last visited Sept. 11, 2015). ALP members
were recruited from the University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center’s
Monthly Survey and the “Abt” SRBI’s National Survey Panel. Id.
47. RAND AM. LIFE PANEL, supra note 45, at 1.
48. See id.
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Although the survey approach helps us better isolate the
effects of particular features of a situation on decision
making, experimental surveys are not without drawbacks.
One key limitation of the present survey is that survey
responses may exhibit hypothetical bias, or a tendency for
choices on the survey to deviate from the actual choices
respondents would make when faced with real-life decisions
with financial and emotional consequences. Hypothetical
bias is a well-documented problem of surveys,49 and may be
particularly likely when questions involve unfamiliar or
highly emotionally charged situations, as in the present
example. It seems reasonable to expect, for example, that
some individuals who profess unwillingness to pursue
litigation under any circumstances might feel differently if
faced with the actual emotional and financial toll of a serious
injury.
We must also be cautious about extrapolating from these
survey responses to litigation attitudes more broadly. The
survey describes a particular situation involving an injury
sustained from a gunman in a stadium; whether the patterns
in these data would persist across other settings or other
forms of injury remains unknown. While it seems plausible
that similar responses would arise if we examined attitudes
towards mass shootings in similar locations, such as
shopping malls, whether these results can guide thinking
about other types of attacks, such as limited-scale violent
actions by terrorists, is unclear.50
Appendix A provides the complete text of the survey.
Respondents were initially presented a scenario in which a
gunman opens fire at a concert, injuring numerous
spectators. Respondents were then asked whether they
would advise a friend or loved one injured in the shooting to
sue, and, if the answer was yes, were given a choice of five
possible parties and asked to indicate which of those parties
49. See James J. Murphy et al., A Meta-Analysis of Hypothetical Bias in Stated
Preference Valuation, 30 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 313, 313-15, 323 (2005).
50. This problem of external validity, however, is not unique to the survey
approach. This problem would also present itself, if, for example, we chose to
study the actual decisions of individuals in a specific setting where there was a
VCF.
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they would sue.51 Multiple responses were permitted. Finally,
all respondents were offered an opportunity to explain their
answer in text box.
We fielded five versions of the survey. The first version
indicated that the injured party had sustained $5000 in
medical and economic losses from their injury, while the
second version makes the amount of the losses $55,000.
Version 3 includes additional text describing a VCF
established
by
charitable
organizations,
corporate
contributions, and private donations, and indicates that the
victims suffering a $5000 loss had also received a $5000
payment from the fund. Versions 4 and 5 also include a VCF,
but vary the amount of loss and recovery. Table 1
summarizes the five versions of the survey.

Version

Is there
How much
a victim
is the loss?
fund?

How much
Amount of
does the
uncompensated
fund pay?
loss

1

No

$5000

N/A

$5000

2

No

$55,000

N/A

$55,000

3

Yes

$5000

$5000

$0

4

Yes

$55,000

$5000

$50,000

5

Yes

$55,000

$50,000

$5000

Table 1: Survey Variants

Because we are focusing on the role of compensation in
shaping attitudes towards litigation, we have chosen to
frame the losses in monetary terms without precisely
specifying the nature of the injury. Clearly, one factor that
can drive litigation is differences between plaintiffs and
defendants in their views regarding the appropriate level of
compensation for a particular injury. We have, to some
degree, abstracted from such differences by specifying losses
51. Because the survey scenario involved violent victimization, we used a
third-person framing as a means of distancing the respondent from the situation.
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in dollar terms. Nevertheless, because we do not provide any
information about non-economic losses, even with this
narrower framing there remains some scope for individual
interpretation regarding what constitutes adequate
compensation. Nonetheless, had we identified particular
types of injuries in the survey, it is possible that responses
may have differed.
Table 2 presents summary statistics describing the
survey population for each of the five versions of the survey,
along with p-values from a joint test for statistically
significant differences in average characteristics across the
five variants. With the exception of marital/relationship
status, none of the demographic differences are statistically
significant at conventional levels, and the practical
differences are minor. These patterns suggest randomization
was implemented successfully. An omnibus test for
randomization fails to reject the null of successful
randomization (p=.945).52 The apparent success of our
randomization procedure provides confidence that any
differences in responses across versions of the survey are
attributable to the changes in conditions described in the
survey and not to other factors.

Characteristic

Average among those responding to
version:
1
2
3
4
5

Joint
Test
P-Value

Female
Hispanic
Black
Age (years)

.600
.216
.125
48.9

.589
.212
.123
49.3

.545
.175
.089
49.7

.595
.161
.133
49.9

.633
.184
.111
50.4

.271
.341
.431
.778

Married
U.S. citizen
College degree

.603
.984
.387

.656
.967
.427

.624
.977
.399

.528
.978
.370

.584
.988
.404

.020
.447
.684

52. We conducted this test by estimating a multinomial logistic model where
the outcome was which of the five surveys was administered and the explanatory
variables included age and age squared, number of household members,
citizenship status, gender, and indicators for race/ethnicity (6 categories), family
income (5 categories), educational attainment (5 categories), marital status (5
categories), and employment status (4 categories). We tested for the joint
significance of all the coefficients in the model.
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Household size
Currently working
Annual family income
>$50K

2.29
.656

2.19
.669

2.14
.677

2.23
.646

2.15
.645

.742
.892

.364

.414

.459

.399

.452

.096

N

305

302

303

316

332

Table 2: Summary Statistics by Survey Version
Note: The final column of the table reports a p-value from a joint test of differences in means
across any of the versions of the survey.

III. RESULTS
A. Quantitative Analysis of Responses
Table 3 presents our main results, demonstrating how
responses to the question about whether to pursue a lawsuit
differ across the various versions of the survey. Across all
versions of the survey, a majority of respondents express a
willingness to pursue a suit, with approximately 90% of
respondents favoring a lawsuit in Version 2 (a $55,000 loss
with no fund), and 51% favoring a lawsuit in Version 3
(a $5000 loss with a $5000 payment from the victim fund).
We can statistically reject the hypothesis that rates of
pursuing a lawsuit are the same across any two of the three
versions of the survey that feature a VCF.

Version

Scenario

1
2
3

$5K loss, no fund
$55K loss, no fund
$5K loss, VCF pays $5K

Fraction Who
Would
Recommend
Lawsuit
85.2%
89.7%
51.5%

4
5

$55K loss, VCF pays $5K
$55K loss, VCF pays $50K

86.4%
62.7%

95%
Confidence
Interval
[81.3% , 89.2%]
[86.3% , 93.2%]
[45.8% , 57.1%]
[82.6% , 90.2%]
[57.4% , 67.9%]

Table 3: Willingness to Sue by Survey Condition

Several other patterns are notable in the data. First, in
the versions of the survey where there is no VCF (Versions 1
and 2), most respondents would pursue a lawsuit, but there
is a non-negligible minority of 10–15% who say they would
not recommend a suit, even with no obvious source of
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compensation for their losses. Below we further explore this
reluctance to recommend a suit by certain individuals.
Second, the fraction of individuals who would recommend a
suit is roughly the same in the first two versions of the
survey, despite the fact that the loss in the first version is
less than one-tenth as large as the loss in the second version.
This suggests that factors other than the amount of loss may
drive decisions to file suit, or alternatively, that losses above
some de minimis level are likely to trigger a lawsuit.
Are decisions to litigate driven primarily by
uncompensated loss rather than total loss? Comparing
Versions 2 and 4 of the survey, which have similar amounts
of uncompensated loss ($55,000 versus $50,000), we see
similar rates of litigation. However, only 63% of respondents
to Version 5 of the survey—which featured $5000 in
uncompensated loss—pursued litigation, whereas the rate of
litigation was 85% in Version 1 of the survey, which had the
same amount of uncompensated loss. This pattern suggests
that respondents use their total loss as a reference point in
thinking about adequacy of compensation, and that it is the
performance relative to this benchmark rather than their
absolute uncompensated loss that influences decisions to
litigate.
If decisions to litigate are made primarily with reference
to reimbursement relative to baseline loss, we would expect
a smaller fraction of respondents to pursue a suit in a variant
with full compensation (a $5000 loss and a $5000 payment)
than the variant with near full compensation (a $55,000 and
a $50,000 payment), despite the fact that the latter group
receives more in absolute dollars. The data reveal precisely
such a pattern. Perhaps less expected is the fact that fully
51% of respondents would pursue litigation even when their
medical and wage losses had been fully compensated. We
explore below the reasons given for pursuing litigation in
such a situation.
Table 4 reports coefficients from a linear probability
regression53 where the outcome is whether an individual
indicated that he or she would recommend a lawsuit, and the
53. Using non-linear alternatives, such as probit or logit, yields very similar
results.
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explanatory variables are the survey version and a set of
demographic characteristics. The coefficients in this
regression measure the expected change in the likelihood of
advocating a suit associated with a particular characteristic,
holding constant the other characteristics in the model.
Consonant with the results in Table 3, Table 4 demonstrates
large and statistically significant differences in willingness
to pursue a suit across survey versions, with those being
compensated for a higher fraction of their economic losses
demonstrating less willingness to sue.
Table 4 also reveals intriguing patterns across
demographic groups in willingness to sue. Age, income,
education, employment status, and family structure are not
strong predictors of willingness to sue. However, women are
about six percentage points less likely to recommend a suit
than men. Relative to non-Hispanic Caucasians, AfricanAmericans are ten percentage points more likely to
recommend a suit, Asians are sixteen percentage points more
likely, and Hispanics are eight percentage points more likely.
These differences cannot be explained by income, since this
is also controlled in the model, and persist when we also
control for state of residence. The precise explanation for
these differences by gender and race/ethnicity remain
unclear; such patterns merit further examination in future
research.

1282

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

Explanatory Variable
Survey version

Coefficient

(reference: $5000 loss, no VCF)
$55,000 loss, no VCF
$5000 loss, $5000 VCF payment
$55,000 loss, $5000 VCF payment
$55,000 loss, $50,000 VCF payment
Female

.049*
(.028)
-.327***
(.035)
.014
(.028)
-.218***
(.033)
-.062***
(.022)
.024
(.079)
.078**
(.030)
.005
(.004)
.000
(.000)
.001
(.008)

U.S. citizen
Hispanic
Age (years)
Age2
# in household

Employment status
(reference: not working)
Employee

-.010
(.027)
.001
(.049)
-.054
(.090)

Self-employed
Other

Education
(reference: Less than HS)
High School only
Some college, no bachelor’s
Bachelor’s degree
Advanced degree

-.013
(.041)
-.004
(.042)
-.053
(.046)
-.049
(.051)
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Race
(reference: White)
African-American

.104***
(.032)
.024
(.085)
.161**
(.073)
.046
(.041)

Native-American
Asian-American
Other

Marital status
(reference: married or living with a partner)
Separated

-.007
(.071)
.001
(.033)
.031
(.052)
.029
(.030)

Divorced
Widowed
Never married

Family income
(reference: <$20K)
$20K–$40K
$40K–$75K
$75–$100K
>$100K
Constant
N
R2

-.013
(.031)
.011
(.033)
-.023
(.040)
-.052
(.043)
.747***
(.140)
1553
.150

Table 4: Regression Estimates Relating Demographics to Willingness to Sue
Note: The table reports coefficients from a linear probability regression model where the
outcome is an 0/1 indicator for whether a particular survey respondent would sue. The
explanatory variables include demographic characteristics of the respondents. The
coefficients measure the difference in the expected probability of suing for someone with a
particular characteristic relative to the reference group, or, for a continuous explanatory
variable such as age, the difference in the expected probability of suit associated with a unit
change in the explanatory variable. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote estimates that are statistically significantly different
from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
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Whom would respondents recommend suing? Table 5
demonstrates that nearly four out of five respondents who
would pursue a suit would target the gunman, and three out
of five would target the security company. About half of
respondents would sue the stadium owner. A smaller but
non-negligible fraction of respondents would sue gun
manufacturers or sellers. The fact that such a large fraction
of respondents would pursue lawsuits against parties other
than the gunman is perhaps surprising, and suggests that
the general public might have fairly broad notions of
responsibility in incidents such as this one. Interestingly,
although the willingness to sue at all was affected by the
presence of a fund and the amount of compensation provided,
the choice of whom to sue was not at all affected by those
variables. This pattern suggests that receiving compensation
from a victim fund may not change recipients’ perceptions
regarding culpability, even if it does alter their willingness to
pursue formal legal action. Below we draw from the
qualitative responses to provide further insight into decisions
regarding whom to sue.
% Suing Among Those Responding Joint
to Version:
Test
1
2
3
4
5
P-value

Lawsuit
Target

% Suing Across All
Versions

Gunman
Stadium
owner
Concert
promoter/
performers
Gun seller/
manufacturer
Security
company
Other

79.1%

77.3% 78.2% 80.1% 81.7% 78.4%

.741

49.7%

52.7% 51.7% 48.1% 47.3% 47.6%

.640

24.8%

25.0% 21.8% 28.8% 28.6% 20.7%

.153

18.2%

16.2% 19.6% 17.9% 21.2% 15.4%

.425

63.3%

63.5% 64.2% 59.0% 64.5% 63.5%

.833

3.5%

4.2%

.423

3.0%

5.1%

3.7%

1.9%

Table 5: Target of Lawsuit by Survey Version
Note: Percentages are conditional on indicating a willingness to sue, and more than one
target can be selected. The final column of the table reports a p-value from a joint test of
differences in means across any of the versions of the survey.

Appendix Table A1 reports regression coefficients from a
model where we explain the total number of parties targeted
as a function of demographic characteristics, limiting the
analysis to those who would recommend a suit. Consistent
with the findings in Table 4, which showed that after
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controlling for other characteristics, women are less willing
to sue and African-Americans are more willing to sue; in this
specification we see that women would target fewer parties,
and African-Americans would target more. There is also
suggestive evidence that the number of parties targeted
increases with education.
Our experimental survey results provide a number of
insights into how VCFs shape attitudes towards litigation.
Our results support Feinberg’s argument that VCFs reduce
willingness to litigate, even when receipt of VCF funds does
not require a waiver of the right to sue.54 Additionally, the
data clearly indicates that the amount of compensation
provided by the VCF matters, with evidence suggesting that
victims measure adequacy of compensation in comparison to
the amount of loss.
B. Qualitative Analysis of Responses
We next draw from the free-form text respondents used
to explain their answers to gain additional insights regarding
attitudes towards litigation following a shooting. Ninety-four
percent of respondents provided an explanation for their
answers, a proportion that did not vary systematically by
survey version. Most offered a sentence or two of explanation,
with an occasional longer, more detailed response.
Additionally, since many respondents offered similar
explanations for the choices regarding whether to sue, we
categorized and coded the free-form responses as an
additional means of exploring respondents’ attitudes.
Why do some respondents choose to not recommend a
suit, even when there is no VCF present and there are
substantial losses? Throughout all versions of the survey,
respondents who advocated not suing provided four common
explanations. First, some respondents indicated that attacks
such as the one outlined in the scenario were akin to random
accidents that are a feature of everyday life, and therefore
felt that no one could be really held responsible through
54. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT 81 (2012) (arguing that the Hokie
Spirit Memorial Fund, which did not require a lawsuit waiver, reduced victims’
willingness to pursue litigation).
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litigation. Figure 1 categorizes and depicts these types of
responses as “risks of life,” and shows that between roughly
5% and 18% of respondents who would not sue cited this as a
reason, depending on the version of the survey. Illustrative
responses in this vein include:
This is a random act. To me it is like a crazy freak accident. How
can you sue a crazy person[?]
Who are the responsible parties? When you freely attend an event
where many people are present, it is impossible to be guaranteed
complete safety.
Any time you go somewhere there is always a possibility of
something happening. I would imagine the people putting on the
event would have checked people entering. We can’t file lawsuits
for everything.

Second, Figure 1 reports a smaller number of
respondents as being “opposed to lawsuits.” Across all
versions of the survey, 11% of respondents cited this as a
reason not to sue. In this category, respondents generally
cited adverse social consequences of lawsuits as a reason not
to sue, for example:
America, the land of the free and frivolous law suits. I’m not sure
that we can do much more at our public venues to prevent/protect
against the sick minded killers in society. Unfortunately in the
shadow of tragedies like this scenario, folks attempt to use the
‘system’ to get rich. I am not trying to sound unsympathetic, but
someone is going to fund these payouts. It all comes back to the
consumer eventually.
[I]n a situation like that, it becomes a circus, where ambulance
chasing lawyers are pushing clients to file, then to settle, so that
the lawyers can get paid. [I]t prolongs the grief as the lawyers and
media rush to exploit the victims, and does nothing to really help
the victims.

A third common explanation was that respondents
recognized the shooter as likely being judgment proof.
Depending on the survey version, Figure 1 reports that
anywhere between 4% to 13% of respondents cited this as an
explanation for not wanting to pursue litigation. Typical
responses that fell in this category of explanations include:
I believe that there is no chance that anyone would be able to collect
from the gunman. The gunman probably has issues that would
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prevent them from having money, so suing them would be
pointless . . . .
I believe the only responsible party is the shooter him/herself, and
I doubt that all of the victims, even if they should file a lawsuit,
would be able to collect any money from the shooter. Thus, I think
that the cost of filing a lawsuit for my ‘friend’ would be a waste, as
there would be nothing to collect.

The fourth reason cited for not suing was a concern over
litigation costs. In the scenarios where the uncompensated
loss was $5000 (Versions 1 and 5), many voiced concern about
whether lawyers’ fees or other litigation costs would be more
than the actual amount of recovery. In particular, Figure 1
shows a large majority of respondents in Version 1 cited
“litigation costs” as a reason not to sue and that over 40% in
Version 5 of the survey concurred. Responses concerning
litigation costs include:
It would cost much more than $5000 to try to get the money from
the responsible parties. It would not be worth the trouble.
I would not recommend to pursue a lawsuit of [$]5000 because the
attorney fees would probably be more than what you would walk
away with.

Others who cited litigation costs as a reason for not suing
focused on the emotional and psychic costs of litigation:
It’s so much more hassle, time, money and energy to pursue a
lawsuit. Yes[,] in the end, you might get more money, but at what
cost emotionally[?]
To go through a law[suit] would take an additional toll on a person.
It is time to heal and not dwell on the past.

Version 5
(N=114)

Version 4
(N=35)

Version 3
(N=133)

Version 2
(N=17)

Version 1
(N=38)
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Costs of litigation
Judgement proof
Risks of life
Opposed to lawsuits
Satisfied with compensation
Other
Costs of litigation
Judgement proof
Risks of life
Opposed to lawsuits
Satisfied with compensation
Other
Costs of litigation
Judgement proof
Risks of life
Opposed to lawsuits
Satisfied with compensation
Other
Costs of litigation
Judgement proof
Risks of life
Opposed to lawsuits
Satisfied with compensation
Other
Costs of litigation
Judgement proof
Risks of life
Opposed to lawsuits
Satisfied with compensation
Other
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Percentage of Respondents
Figure 1: Explanations Provided by Respondents
Who Would Not Pursue Litigation

Note: This figure reports the authors’ tabulations of the free-form responses explaining why
victims choose not to pursue litigation. The tabulations are limited to those with usable
responses, and the response categories are not mutually exclusive.

This reasoning regarding costs was much less apparent
among those responding to the version of the survey with a
$55,000 or $50,000 loss (Versions 2 and 4), and may help to
explain why the VCF can provide a means of reducing
litigation. Figure 1 shows that when compared to
respondents who incurred $5000 in losses (survey Versions 1
and 5), respondents who incurred $50,000 to $55,000 in
losses (Versions 2 and 4) were significantly less likely to cite
litigation costs as a reason not to sue. These patterns suggest
that some respondents view pursuing litigation as involving
fairly high fixed costs that were only worth sustaining if
there was the possibility of a commensurate payoff. Even if a
VCF does not provide full compensation, to the extent that it
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narrows the gap between loss and compensation to a level
closer to what is perceived as representing the fixed cost of
litigation, it may deter lawsuits.
As suggested by the quantitative results, the free-form
responses indicated that the amount of compensation
provided by the fund is important. As two respondents to
Version 4 of the survey who supported filing suit stated
succinctly:
Receiving $5000 is not much compared to losing $55,000.
The $5000 compensated from the victims’ fund is way too little.

Moreover, only four of forty-four respondents to Version
4 of the survey who chose not to sue and explained their
answer indicated that the payment from the VCF influenced
their decision to forego a lawsuit. Overall, the pattern of
explanations offered in Version 4 of the survey were largely
similar to those for Version 2, again suggesting that an overly
small VCF payment exerts little effect on judgments
regarding whether to pursue litigation and whom to target.
In contrast, Figure 1 shows that many respondents who
received full or almost full compensation for their economic
loss (Versions 3 and 5) and were unwilling to recommend a
suit, found compensation to be sufficient. In particular, some
respondents felt that it would be unfair and selfish to sue.
For example:
You already got what was compensated to you, why would you want
to be greedy and pursue for more. Being greedy will not lead to
nothing good.
The purpose of a civil lawsuit is to recover actual damages that the
litigant has sustained. A lawsuit should not be a source of money
beyond what is necessary to restore a person to health or go back to
work.

These responses are consistent with prior scholarship
emphasizing the compensation function of the tort system.55
In short, VCFs that can provide full or nearly full

55. See Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort
Law, 91 Geo. L.J. 585, 629-30 (2003); Priest, supra note 35, at 5.
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compensation can reduce the likelihood that victims will feel
a need to resort to litigation.
On the opposite end of the spectrum from those who
would not pursue a suit, even following a substantial loss and
no compensation, are those who indicate they would sue even
when fully compensated for economic loss. One of the more
striking patterns in the survey is the fact that more than half
of respondents in Versions 3 and 5 of the survey—where
compensation for economic loss was at or near 100%—
expressed a willingness to pursue a lawsuit. The high rate of
lawsuits suggests that compensation is only one reason
among many that citizens may wish to access the tort system.
Respondents who would pursue a lawsuit cited two
predominant reasons for their behavior. The first was a
desire to assign responsibility to those parties viewed as
being at fault, and in some cases to pursue retribution
against such parties. Figure 2 categorizes these responses as
“accountability/retribution,” and reports that in all versions
of the survey, this category accounted for at least 60% of all
explanations provided by respondents who were willing to
sue. For these respondents, litigation was less about
receiving money than ensuring accountability and inflicting
punishment. Representative responses along these lines
include:
The injuries that people sustained are life-changing and disrupt
their overall wellbeing especially their sense of peace and safety.
For this reason, the people responsible should be held accountable
by filing a lawsuit.
A civil suit against the gunman would punish the gunman by
depleting him/her of any assets that otherwise would not be
affected by a criminal conviction.
Automatic payment does not punish the shooter. Hitting the pocket
book does.

These responses are consistent with findings in the literature
more broadly, namely, that plaintiffs’ objectives in litigation

2015]

VICTIM COMPENSATION FUNDS

1291

can be driven by the desire for accountability56 or to inflict
punishment on a wrongdoer.57
It remains unclear whether such attitudes would persist
in a real-life scenario in which there was more information
and publicity surrounding the criminal prosecution of the
gunman. For example, in a situation more akin to the Boston
Marathon bombing, where one of the alleged perpetrators
was seriously injured during a police pursuit and now faces
the death penalty if convicted, victims might view the
criminal justice system as providing adequate retribution
without the need to impose additional penalties through the
civil justice system. On the other hand, several respondents
cited a need to hold other parties responsible who likely
would not fall under the purview of the criminal justice
system. For example, one respondent noted:
Corporations that sell guns should be responsible for the negative
actions that come from their products.

It is possible that such a concern could only be addressed
through a civil suit.
Beyond
assigning
responsibility
and
inflicting
punishment, the other main reason cited for pursuing
litigation was a desire for compensation. We categorized
responses desiring some kind of payment as “[i]nadequately
compensated” under Figure 2, which also shows that across
all survey versions, at least 25% of respondents who pursue
a suit did so to obtain additional compensation. Interestingly,
Figure 2 reveals relatively little variation across survey
56. See Hadfield, supra note 17, at 661; Tyler, supra note 39, at 202-03.
57. See Relis, supra note 36, at 363 fig.4. Take for example a respondent in
Hadfield’s study who had opted for litigation rather than a payment from the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund. The litigant indicated that pursuing
a tort claim was
one way of saying no, it wasn’t just the terrorists. There was a lot of
ordinary negligence that led to people’s deaths . . . . It’s not just about
the facts; there is a need to bring those facts to accountability . . . .
....
What I’m looking for is justice—someone held accountable for the
murder. There are people who did not do their job. No one has been fired,
demoted.
Hadfield, supra note 17, at 662 (first alteration in original).
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versions in the proportion of respondents who cite inadequate
compensation; it is not the case that respondents who
received more from the VCF who would have ultimately
chosen to sue were appreciably less concerned about
adequacy of compensation. However, it is worth noting that
because these responses are conditional on being willing to
pursue a suit in the first place, all these data indicate is that
among those who would sue, their reasons for doing so seem
roughly comparable across survey conditions.
Many responses related to inadequate compensation
focused on insuring against potential future unforeseen
costs, particularly when VCF compensation was at or near
economic loss (Versions 3 and 5). For example, one
respondent succinctly stated:
I feel compensation
complications.

is

justified

for

future

unfor[e]seen

Others replied in a similar vein:

Version Version Version Version Version
5
4
3
2
1
(N=178) (N=253) (N=138) (N=238) (N=220)

A lawsuit should be pursued because of the probability of medical
and/or mental issues that have yet to surface.
Accountability/retribution
Inadequately compensated
Other
Accountability/retribution
Inadequately compensated
Other
Accountability/retribution
Inadequately compensated
Other
Accountability/retribution
Inadequately compensated
Other
Accountability/retribution
Inadequately compensated
Other
0%

20% 40% 60% 80%
Percentage of Respondents

100%

Figure 2: Explanations Provided By Respondents Who Would Pursue Litigation
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Note: This figure reports the authors’ tabulations of the free-form responses
explaining why victims choose to pursue litigation. The tabulations are limited to
those with usable responses, and the response categories are not mutually exclusive.

I would imagine that there would be trauma and treatment
necessary (including psychological) beyond the immediate wage
loss and first year of medical treatment.

These specific responses point to a possible dilemma
facing those who design victim funds. Architects of such
funds, most notably Ken Feinberg, have argued that
providing prompt payment should be a major objective of the
funds in order to reduce uncertainty and allow victims to
move on as quickly as possible.58 However, payments made
before the full extent of injuries is realized may leave victims
in the position of wishing to pursue litigation later to recover
future unforeseen losses.
The qualitative responses also provide insights into the
choice of whom to sue. Many respondents viewed the stadium
owner and security company as sharing culpability with the
gunman, because they could have prevented the incident if
they had screened attendees better or taken more active
security precautions. For example,
The owner of the stadium and security guards had a responsibility
to the attendees to provide a safe environment—they did not. They
could be held accountable for the safety of their patrons. And the
gunman could obviously be sued because he broke the law and
injured people.

Similarly, another respondent noted:
I would advise my friend to sue them because security and the
owner of the stadium were not properly protecting the public from
guns. This could have be[en] prevented, yet people were injured due
to inefficient security and the stadium owners.

The responses that focus on the possibility of using the
tort system to prompt behavioral change echo work by Gillian
58. See FEINBERG, supra note 54, at 79-81, 159-64; see also Mark Arsenault &
Todd Wallack, One Fund Payments will Include Those Treated as Outpatients,
BOS. GLOBE (May 15, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/2013/05/15/one-fundpayments-will-include-those-treated-hospital-outpatients/y0rsHCwTEgx5s
JZJLARwiI/story.html.
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Hadfield, whose study featured respondents who thought
that litigation (as opposed to the alternative—the 9/11 Victim
Compensation Fund) might give them the opportunity to
enable “responsive policy change—making sure that lessons
were learned and heeded in the future.”59
Whether similar attitudes would arise in other shootings
or mass-casualty events may depend in part on the type of
facility where an event occurred. The Aurora, Newtown, Ft.
Hood, and Navy Yard shootings seem similar to the survey
scenario in that these events occurred in a facility with
controlled access, which likely provides bystanders with a
greater expectation regarding security. Virginia Tech
provides a sort of intermediate case where the shootings
occurred on private property but in a facility where public
access is not restricted; shopping malls, restaurants, and
other retail spaces offer other examples. The Boston bombing
occurred in a location that was completely open to the public.
It is unclear whether views regarding the culpability of the
property owner or security providers would persist in
scenarios occurring in more public spaces.
Perhaps somewhat contrary to intuition, among those
who would pursue a suit, nearly one in five would not target
the gunman. The qualitative responses reveal a perhaps
surprising degree of understanding regarding the fact that
the gunman is likely judgment-proof, meaning that actually
receiving compensation would necessitate including other
parties in the lawsuit. Two illustrative comments on this
score were:
It depends on my friend[’]s situation. If he or she was so desperate
for money, like about to lose their home I’d say yes pursue a lawsuit.
But the person to blame is the shooter and most likely they wouldn’t
have the money to pay in a law suit;” and “[t]he gunman is the one
responsible for his actions, regardless if he is likely to have less
money than the other options.

Although not a widespread view, as for the first
respondent above, some expressed willingness to sue parties
they did not necessarily view as culpable in order to ensure
that compensation was sufficient. For example, one

59. Hadfield, supra note 17, at 648.
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respondent who chose to sue all of the listed parties in the
survey explained the response as follows:
It would be necessary to sue all parties involved[,] . . . the injured
should be compensated for their injuries [and] suing each of them
increases chan[c]es of getting compensation.

Another respondent who indicated willingness to sue the
security company stated:
I would want to be compensated for my injuries, [a]lthough you
can’t really blame anyone for someone else[’]s actions.

To summarize, our qualitative analysis reveals a number
of factors that affect the expected amount of litigation in the
wake of a mass shooting. Some fraction of the population
profess
unwillingness
to
sue
despite
incurring
uncompensated losses, primarily due to either a belief that
random injuries are an unavoidable feature of life, and
therefore not deserving of special compensation, or a view
that lawsuits generate undesirable social consequences.
Respondents also pointed to high-perceived financial and
emotional costs of litigation relative to expected returns and
a likelihood that the gunman was judgment-proof as barriers
to pursuing recovery in the courts.
Among those who would pursue a lawsuit, the most
commonly cited reason for doing so was to ensure that
culpability was properly assigned to responsible parties
and/or that these parties were appropriately penalized.
These latter findings reinforce results from the existing
work, where plaintiffs “stress[ ] that they sued not for money,
but rather for principles,”60 including the principles of
accountability, punishment, and acknowledgement of harm.61
Additionally, a non-negligible proportion of those who would
pursue litigation were motivated by a desire to ensure that
their losses are fully compensated. Many respondents were
sensitive to the possibility that payments made shortly after
a loss might not be sufficient to cover unforeseen future
complications, and advocated litigation as a hedge against
potential future costs, even if compensation was already
60. Relis, supra note 36, at 383.
61. Id. at 363 fig.4.
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generous. The availability of comparatively “deep pockets”
also appeared to promote litigation among a subset of
respondents.
These responses broadly suggest conditions that may
affect the ability of VCFs to achieve one oft-cited policy goal
of reducing post-event litigation. Given that many cited
accountability and retribution as primary reasons for
pursuing litigation, litigation may be less likely in situations
where the perpetrator is killed or the criminal justice system
is viewed as providing sufficient retribution against
wrongdoers. Many respondents who expressed a willingness
to sue due to inadequate compensation cited the potential for
future complications as an important factor, suggesting that
VCFs may perform differently depending on whether injuries
are well-defined at the time of payment and the likelihood of
future complications is low. Even if VCFs lack the resources
to fully compensate individuals for injuries, partial
compensation may in some cases reduce litigation because
many individuals view participation in the court system as
carrying appreciable fixed monetary and emotional costs,
and are therefore willing to forego litigation even when there
is some uncompensated loss. However, if VCF payments are
too small relative to loss, they may leave litigation rates
largely unchanged. Finally, the substantial number of
respondents who would pursue a lawsuit even when fully
compensated for economic loss suggests there may be limits
to the extent to which VCFs on their own can foreclose
litigation.
C. How Do Survey Responses Compare to Real-World
Behavior?
The surveys provide interesting insights regarding how
VCFs could affect attitudes towards litigation, but the
usefulness of these data for policy purposes depend in part on
how well the findings from surveys such as ours generalize to
real-world behavior. In this Section, we review seven recent
VCFs that have arisen in the wake of mass injury events that
bear some similarity to the scenario presented in our survey,
and qualitatively examine what is known about litigation
following those events. Consonant with the findings of our
survey, the experience with recent VCFs suggest that
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monetary compensation is an important factor shaping
attitudes towards litigation, but it is not necessarily the only
determinant of whether victims choose to sue. Victims who
do sue cite many of the same reasons for pursuing legal action
as were cited in our survey, including a desire for
accountability and concerns over future injury, while those
who do not sue often cite the financial and emotional costs of
tort litigation. Moreover, we see some suggestive evidence
that litigation is more likely following events where VCF
compensation is limited or non-existent. In short, recent
historical experience appears to corroborate a number of the
empirical findings from our survey.
1. Oklahoma City Community Foundation Disaster
Relief Fund
Following the Oklahoma City bombing at the Alfred P.
Murrah federal building, the Oklahoma City Community
Foundation Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) was established to
collect donations and distribute relief.62 To this day, the fund
is still in existence.63 Because donor intent varied, the DRF is
actually comprised of several sub-funds, each serving a
different purpose for victims.64 As a whole, the fund generally
pays for unmet medical expenses, funeral expenses, utilities,
car payments, mortgages, rent, etc.65 Additionally, a large
portion of the funds are earmarked to assist children of the
deceased with educational expenses for undergraduate and
vocational schooling.66 In total, the fund has received
$14,688,61167 and has doled out $7,295,071 directly to 1033
victims.68 Eighteen years after the bombing, the fund still had
62. BKD LLP, OKLAHOMA CITY DISASTER RELIEF FUND, INC.: FORENSIC
INVESTIGATION REPORT 8-10 (2013), http://www.occf.org/documents/Oklahoma
CityDisasterReliefFdreportissued3-20-13.pdf.
63. Oklahoma City Disaster Relief Fund, OKLA. CITY COMMUNITY FOUND.,
http://www.occf.org/drf (last visited Sept. 18, 2015).
64. BKD LLP, supra note 62, at 18.
65. Id. at 21.
66. Id. at 23.
67. Id. at 20.
68. Id. at 26.
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a $10,000,000 account balance from investment income and
earmarked donations.69
The DRF differs from more recent funds in several
respects. The DRF does not make direct lump sum payments,
rather, the fund assesses victims’ needs and then
compensates after other funding sources have been
exhausted.70 For example, the DRF will pay for unmet
medical expenses related to the bombing when insurance
does not cover costs.71 Other funds discussed below, however,
give victims a one time payment based solely on their
injuries, which can be spent for any purpose. DRF funds have
also been used to provide outputs such as scholarships that
are not directly tied to economic loss from the event itself.72
Victims groups have expressed dismay at the fund’s large
remaining balance, and, by implication, the fact that the fund
has paid out less in compensation than it could have.73
Indeed, frustrated victims sued the Oklahoma Governor and
Oklahoma City Mayor over the administration and
distribution of funds donated after the bombing. While there
have only been a handful of lawsuits related to the bombing,74
69. Id. at 20.
70. Id. at 16-17, 23.
71. Id. at 22-23.
72. Id. at 23-25.
73. Randy Ellis, Oklahoma City Bombing Fund Officials Say Criticism Unjust,
NEWSOK (Nov. 12, 2012), http://newsok.com/oklahoma-city-bombing-fund-official
s-say-criticism-unjust/article/3727548/?page=1; OKLAHOMAN EDITORIAL BD.,
Audit Should End Talk of Oklahoma City Bombing Fund Being Mismanaged,
NEWSOK (Mar. 24, 2013), http://newsok.com/audit-should-end-talk-of-oklahomacity-bombing-fund-being-mismanaged/article/3769340/?page=1; see also BKD
LLP, supra note 62, at 20-23 (describing the substantial remaining balance of the
relief fund).
74. Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, 160 F.3d 613, 613-18 (10th Cir. 1998);
Gaines-Tabb v. Mid-Kansas Coop. Ass’n, 980 F. Supp. 1424, 1426 (D. Kan. 1997);
Ed Godfrey, Day-Care Center, ATF, Chemical Firm Sued, NEWSOK (Apr. 19,
1997), http://newsok.com/day-care-center-atf-chemical-firm-sued/article/257647
6; Ed Godfrey, Lawsuit Seeks Accounting for Disaster Donations, NEWSOK (June
28, 1995), http://newsok.com/lawsuit-seeks-accounting-for-disaster-donations/art
icle/2506849; Ellie Sutter, Last Rescued Victim Files $4 Million Suit, NEWSOK
(May 12, 1995), http://newsok.com/last-rescued-victim-files-4-million-suit/article/
2502246.
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at least two were class actions involving over three-hundred
plaintiffs.75
Some Oklahoma bombing victims also pursued lawsuits
as a means of achieving accountability for the attacks. While
prosecutors convicted and sentenced three perpetrators for
the bombing, some victims were not satisfied by the answers
provided from the criminal trials.76 Consequently, several
victims sued the country of Iraq in 2002, alleging Ramzi
Yousef, a convicted terrorist, was an Iraqi government agent
who recruited the Oklahoma City bombing perpetrators to
conduct terrorist attacks in the United States.77 In short, the
U.S. government’s investigation and criminal trials may not
have provided enough accountability in the eyes of some
victims.
2. Mile High United Way Healing Fund
The Mile High United Way created the Healing Fund the
day of the Columbine High School shooting.78 The fund raised
about $4,600,000 for the victims.79 Unlike the DRF, this fund
distributed several lump sum payments to the victims to be
spent as they chose.80 Initial payments included $50,000 each
for the thirteen families of the deceased, $150,000 each to
four victims who suffered brain and spinal injuries, and
$10,000 each to twenty-one other physically injured victims.81
The fund reportedly distributed an additional $1,115,000 to

75. See Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, 160 F.3d at 613; Gaines-Tabb v. MidKansas Coop. Ass’n, 980 F. Supp. at 1426.
76. See Jennifer L. Brown, Oklahoma Victims Sue Iraq, FAYETTEVILLE
OBSERVER, Mar. 21, 2002, at 11A, http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1559&
dat=20020321&id=Rm05AAAAIBAJ&sjid=eykMAAAAIBAJ&pg=1347,
18268871.
77. Lawton v. Republic of Iraq, 581 F. Supp. 2d 43, 44 (D.D.C. 2008).
78. WILLIAM H. ERICKSON, THE REPORT OF GOVERNOR BILL OWENS’ COLUMBINE
REVIEW COMMISSION 133 (2001), http://trac.state.co.us/Documents/Reports%20
and%20Publications/Columbine_2001_Governor_Review_Commission.pdf.
79. Id. at 133 n.270.
80. See id. at 133 n.271
81. Id.
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twelve of the most seriously injured victims.82 In total, about
$2,575,000 went to victims and their families in the form of
lump sum payments. The remaining funds, amounting to
millions of dollars, went to nonprofits administering outreach
programs, victim services, and other community programs.83
Soon after the Healing Fund began collecting a
significant amount of donations, victims expressed varied
opinions over how they felt the funds should be distributed.84
Some believed the money should be divided equally, while
others felt the money should be distributed based on the
victims’ actual needs.85 Tensions reached the point where
representatives of the victims met with fund administrators
to address the conflicting concerns.86 Ultimately, fund
administrators and victims reached a compromise because a
little over half of the funds were directed to victims and the
rest to service providers and community programs.87
Seventeen lawsuits ultimately followed the Columbine
shooting,88 and both the need for compensation and desire to
assign blame to responsible parties appear to have factored
into victims’ calculations regarding whether to sue. While
some victims did accept settlements from the defendants,89
82. Id.
83. See id.; see also Dana Liebelson, CHARTS: Where Did the Money Donated
to Columbine, Aurora, and Virginia Tech Mass-Shooting Victims Go?, MOTHER
JONES (Apr. 8, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/04/
where-does-money-donated-victims-mass-shootings-go (noting that the Healing
Fund took in roughly $4.5 million from charitable donations following the
Columbine shooting).
84. Kieran Nicholson & Jim Kirksey, Feelings Healed Over Healing Fund,
DENVER POST (May 27, 1999), http://extras.denverpost.com/news/shot0527a.htm.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. ERICKSON, supra note 78, at 133 n.271.
88. Chelsea Kelly, Mass Shooting Lawsuits Can Serve Purpose, HARTFORD
COURANT (Feb. 4, 2014), http://articles.courant.com/2014-02-04/news/hc-op-freshtalk-kelly-mass-shooting-lawsuits-usef-20140204_1_columbine-lawsuits-erinpeterson-julia-pryde.
89. Michael Janofsky, $2.53 Million Deal Ends Some Columbine Lawsuits,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/20/us/2.53-milliondeal-ends-some-columbine-lawsuits.html.
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others pushed forward, seeking accountability.90 For
instance, some victims refused to accept settlements from the
parents of the two gunmen, insisting that they wanted
answers for their behavior.91 One family in particular, who
sued the parents of the gunmen for $250 million, indicated
that their suit was not about money but was instead focused
on assigning blame for the parents’ negligent behavior and
preventing similar future tragedies.92 Others sued the
principal and several teachers of Columbine High School,
stating these officials knew of the gunmen’s violent
tendencies and should have taken action.93 Ultimately, these
victims never obtained accountability, as their suit was
dismissed based upon a judgment that the school officials
were protected by government immunity.94
3. Hokie Spirit Memorial Fund
Established after a student killed thirty-two people at
Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech), the Hokie
Spirit Memorial Fund collected and distributed over $7
million in donations to victims.95 Unlike the funds discussed
above, nearly all proceeds went directly to the victims in the
form of lump sum payments. Families of the thirty-two
deceased received $208,000 and forty-eight victims who were
physically injured or present at the scene of the shooting
received an average payment of $35,668.75.96 Upon receipt of

90. See id.
91. See id.
92. Columbine Lawsuits May Go Beyond Shooters’ Parents, CNN (May 27,
1999, 7:02 PM), http://www.cnn.com/US/9905/27/columbine.lawsuit.04; $250
Million Columbine Lawsuit Filed, CNN (May 27, 1999, 1:23 PM), http://www.cnn.
com/US/9905/27/columbine.lawsuit.02.
93. Julia Campbell, Principal and School Officials Named in Columbine Suit,
ABC NEWS (July 20, 2006), http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=96453&page=1.
94. Most Columbine Lawsuits Dismissed, CBS (Apr. 29, 2009, 2:25 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-319250.html.
95. FEINBERG, supra note 54, at 202.
96. Id.
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payment, victims did not waive their right to litigation.97
Thus, victims could take the money and sue for even more.
Only two victims of the approximately two hundred
potential claimants sued the university in connection with
the shooting.98 One explanation for the paucity of suits may
be that victims found compensation from the Fund to be
adequate; some commentators, including the Fund’s
administrator, Ken Feinberg, have argued that the Fund
made a significant impact.99 An alternative explanation is
that the stringent nature of Virginia’s tort law, which caps
damages against the state at $100,000, was the primary
determining factor rather than the Fund.100 However, the two
explanations are not fully exclusive—if victims utilized a
cost-benefit analysis in deciding whether to sue, and weighed
potential recovery in a suit against unmet needs for
compensation and the costs of litigation, the presence of the
fund may have tipped the scale against litigation,
particularly given the limited availability of damages.101
Both plaintiffs were successful at the trial court level.102
In the initial judgment, the jury found the State was
negligent and awarded the plaintiffs $4 million, which was
subsequently reduced to $100,000 by the trial court and
eventually overturned by the Virginia Supreme Court.103
Nevertheless, victims felt some vindication from the jury’s
verdict. One parent of a slain Virginia Tech student stated
that the lawsuit was about accountability, not money, and
“still t[ook] a good measure of satisfaction that the jury
listened to all of the evidence and decided as it did. We don’t
97. Id. at 81.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (2007); see also FEINBERG, supra note 54, at 81.
101. See FEINBERG, supra note 54, at 81.
102. J. Freedom du Lac, Va. Supreme Court Overturns Verdict in Wrongful
Death Suit Against Virginia Tech, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.washi
ngtonpost.com/local/va-supreme-court-overturns-verdict-in-wrongful-death-suitagainst-virginia-tech/2013/10/31/047864ac-423c-11e3-a751-f032898f2dbc_story_
1.html.
103. Id. The Court reasoned that the State did not have a duty to warn Virginia
Tech students of the potential for violent acts by the shooter. Id.
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feel at all that the Supreme Court can take that away from
us.”104
Another measure of accountability may have come from
the U.S. Department of Education, which found in 2012—
after payments from the VCF had been made but before the
two lawsuits over the tragedy had been resolved—that
Virginia Tech violated the Clery Act and fined the
university.105 The Clery Act requires universities to issue
timely warnings of threats to students, and the Department
of Education found Virginia Tech failed to properly warn
students after the gunman committed his first attack on the
campus that day.106 Like the jury verdict finding Virginia
Tech negligent, this administrative finding may have
provided the accountability and satisfaction some victims
desired. Administrative processes such as this could provide
a means of accountability without incurring the costs of
litigation.
4. Association of the United States Army Fort Hood
Shooting Fund
On November 5, 2009, Major Nidal Hasan, a U.S. Army
officer, shot and killed thirteen soldiers and civilians and
wounded more than thirty-two others at Fort Hood, Texas.107
Immediately after the shooting, the Fort Hood chapter of the
Association of the United States Army (AUSA), a non-profit
group, established a modest VCF for the victims.108 The
AUSA collected $1 million, but as of November 2013, had not

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 11-30-SF,
at 3-4 (Aug. 30, 2012).
107. Moni Basu, As Hasan Trial Starts, Fort Hood Victims Feel Betrayed, CNN
(Aug. 11, 2013, 12:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/10/us/fort-hood-victims/
index.html.
108. Fort Hood Tragedy: How You Can Help Right Now, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/05/help-forthood-victims-do_n_347821.html.
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yet distributed funds to the victims.109 Thus, the Fort Hood
shooting provides an example of an event with qualitative
similarities to other mass injury events examined here, but
that involved no real VCF compensation in the first three
years post-event.
Our survey responses suggest that lawsuits are more
likely in an environment in which no VCF money is available,
and the Fort Hood experience thus far seems to support that
conclusion. Motivated in part by concern about the level of
compensation being provided by the federal government for
their injuries, a number of survivors filed a civil suit which
named the U.S. Army, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), the Department of Defense, Nidal Hasan, and Anwar
al-Awlaki’s estate as defendants.110 Many Americans saw the
shooting as a terrorist attack because Hasan’s motivation for
the shooting was to defend the Taliban111 and because he
consulted frequently with Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical cleric
affiliated with Al Qaeda.112 Nevertheless, the Army initially
designated the shooting as workplace violence.113 This
classification denied survivors access to additional benefits
provided to soldiers and civilians wounded in a theater of
combat.114 Hence, the survivors sued to have the incident

109. Fort Hood Charity Tight-Lipped About $1M collected, CBS DFW (Nov. 3,
2013, 8:42 PM), http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2013/11/03/fort-hood-charity-tight-lippedabout-1m-collected.
110. Charley Keyes, Victims of Fort Hood Shooting Sue the Army for $750
Million, CNN (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/11/us/texas-fort-hoodlawsuit; Matt Pearce, Fort Hood Shooting Victims Accuse U.S. of Neglect,
Betrayal, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/13/
nation/la-na-nn-fort-hood-victims-forgotten-20130213; Fort Hood Shooting
Victims Sue Government, CBS (Nov. 5, 2012, 9:28 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/fort-hood-shooting-victims-sue-government.
111. Basu, supra note 107.
112. Larry Shaughnessy, Hasan’s Email Exchange with al-Awlaki; Islam,
Money and Matchmaking, CNN (July 20, 2012, 12:32 AM), http://security.blogs.
cnn.com/2012/07/20/hasans-e-mail-exchange-with-al-awlaki-islam-money-andmatchmaking.
113. Basu, supra note 107.
114. Id.
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re-designated as an enemy attack115 and in February 2015,
the Army relented and announced that it would award the
Purple Heart and its civilian equivalent, the Defense of
Freedom Medal, to shooting victims.116
The civil complaint in the Fort Hood case also suggests
that some litigants are motivated by a desire to establish
clearer accountability for the event. Prior to the shooting,
Hasan consulted by email with Anwar al-Awlaki about the
religious justifications for killing unarmed people.117
Accordingly, survivors, in their lawsuit against Awlaki’s
estate, allege that he was responsible for the shooting
because he inspired Hasan to carry out the attack.118
Additionally, because the FBI was monitoring the email
communication between the two,119 the survivors argue that
the Bureau shares some responsibility for not preventing the
attack.120 Furthermore, the survivors’ complaint alleges
Army officials disregarded troubling signs of Hasan’s
radicalism by ignoring disturbing reports by his peers.121 In
short, a court judgment establishing fault on behalf of the
defendants, or a settlement where the defendants admit
fault, could provide the justice and accountability survivors
seek in addition to compensation.
5. Tucson Together Fund
The Tucson Together Fund was an amalgamation of
three charitable relief funds established after the January 8,
2011 shooting by Jared Loughner in Tucson, Arizona.122 The
115. See Complaint at ¶¶ 307-23, Manning v. McHugh, No. 1:12-CV-01802
(D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2012), 2012 WL 5384166 [hereinafter Manning Compl.].
116. Laura Koran & Jamie Crawford, Fort Hood Victims to be Awarded Purple
Hearts, CNN (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/06/politics/fort-hoodpurple-hearts.
117. See Shaughnessy, supra note 112.
118. See Manning Compl., supra note 115, at ¶¶ 203-08.
119. See id. at ¶¶ 18, 258.
120. See id. at ¶ 269.
121. See id. at ¶ 24.
122. See KENT BURBANK, PIMA CTY. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, A TRAINING OUTLINE:
TUCSON’S EXPERIENCE IN MANAGING MULTIPLE VICTIM FUNDS 1-2 (2011), https://
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attack left six dead and thirteen wounded.123 Among the
victims was the Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for
Arizona, John Roll, who was killed, and U.S. Representative
Gabrielle Giffords, who was severely wounded.124 The fund
received over $500,000125 and worked in conjunction with two
other compensation sources: Arizona’s Victim Compensation
Program and a federal Anti-Terrorism Relief Grant.126 The
fund compensated victims for expenses not covered by these
two other sources, such as lost wages, funeral expenses, and
travel expenses.127 To provide quick relief, the fund
distributed several small lump sum payments “intended for
personal incidental expenses not covered by a government
program or fund.”128 In all, the fund distributed $454,500 in
lump sum payments, $31,142 for lost wages, $15,970 for
victim travel expenses, $6943 for funeral expenses, and
$4512 for additional counseling expenses.129
Surprisingly, there has been little controversy involving
the Fund, nor to our knowledge have there been lawsuits
regarding liability for the shooting. We posit several possible
explanations for this behavior that are consistent with our
survey findings. First, victims may have felt that
compensation, or at least the process of receiving
compensation, was fair. Because there were relatively few
victims compared to other VCFs, and the fund set procedures
to protect the victims’ identities, fund administrators
www.ncjtc.org/CONF/Ovcconf/AttMat/Understanding%20Victim%20Compensati
on_Burbank_Handout.pdf.
123. Id. at 1.
124. Arizona Congresswoman Giffords Shot; Doctors ‘Optimistic’ About Recovery
Chances, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Jan. 8, 2011, 7:45 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/
news/articles/2011/01/08/20110108arizona-giffords-brk.html.
125. BURBANK, supra note 122, at 3.
126. See id.
127. See Nicole Brophy, Spring Training Game to Benefit Victims of Tuscon
Tragedy, ARIZ. FOOTHILLS MAG., http://www.arizonafoothillsmagazine.com/tucson
/tucson-travel-and-leisure/1916-spring-training-game-to-benefit-victims-oftuscon-tragedy.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2015).
128. See BURBANK, supra note 122, at 7.
129. E-mail from Kent Burbank, Dir. of Victim Servs., Pima Cty. Attorney’s
Office, to authors (Dec. 20, 2013) (on file with authors).
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developed trust among the victims, enabling them to
distribute relief quickly.130 Additionally, all proceeds of the
fund went directly to the victims and not non-profits, a move
aimed at avoiding controversies experienced by prior VCFs.131
Moreover, while the fund itself may not have provided as
much dollar compensation for each victim as other funds,
administrators designed the fund to maximize compensation
by working alongside Arizona’s Victim Compensation
Program and an Anti-Terrorism Relief Grant.132 Thus, in the
presence of three compensation sources, victims had a
greater chance of having their losses fully compensated.
Altogether, the fund administrator felt the fund compensated
nearly all of the victims’ financial losses.133
Our survey responses revealed that many citizens
understand that lawsuits may not be worthwhile in the
absence of “deep pockets” who possess the financial
wherewithal to provide compensation, and the Loughner case
may provide an example where victims recognized that the
likelihood of receiving compensation was slim. The most
attractive target for a negligence suit would be Pima
Community College, where Loughner was a student, because
the college was well aware of his disturbing behavior prior to
the shooting.134 However, the college took corrective measures
by reporting the killer’s behavior to the police on several
occasions and suspending him until he sought mental health
treatment.135 In theory, the college could have gone further by
seeking court ordered mental health treatment, which would
130. Telephone Interview with Kent Burbank, Dir. of Victim Servs., Pima Cty.
Attorney’s Office (Sept. 23, 2013).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Pima Community College Was On Alert About Jared Loughner One
Week Before Giffords Shooting, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 16, 2011, 12:00 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/15/pima-community-college-jared-lough
ner_n_823838.html.
135. See Jacques Billeaud & Terry Tang, Jared Loughner at Pima Community
College: Emails Document Unstable Personality, HUFFINGTON POST (May 20,
2011, 7:42 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/20/jared-loughner-at-pi
ma-co_n_864548.html.
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have made it illegal for Loughner to possess firearms,136 but
a successful negligence suit under Arizona law on that basis
would likely require a finding that the college owed a duty to
the shooting victims to seek court-ordered medical treatment
for Loughner.137 Courts may be reluctant to make such a
ruling because this could pressure colleges into actions that
might potentially violate students’ rights.138
Another factor that may have acted to limit litigation in
the Tucson case was the perceived legitimacy of the criminal
justice process. Criminal prosecution proceeded relatively
quickly, as Loughner pled guilty and was sentenced to life in
prison within two years of the shooting.139 Overall, victims
appeared to be satisfied with the outcome,140 as the court
sentenced him according to the shared intent of most victims
to avoid the death sentence.141 Some victims were able to use
136. Larry Abramson, The Tucson Shootings and Mental Health Procedures,
NPR (Jan. 11, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/01/11/132840720/
Alleged-Shooters-Mental-Health-And-College-Career.
137. Under Arizona negligence law, a finding of a duty to protect from third
persons is a difficult threshold to meet. See DOUGLAS A. BLAZE & JEFFERSON L.
LANKFORD, THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE IN ARIZONA § 2.05 (3d ed. 2003).
138. Pima Community College was concerned about violating Loughner’s rights
when considering taking further actions. Robert Anglen & Dennis Wagner,
College Unsure How to Handle Loughner’s Behavior, Emails Show, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC (May 20, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/
2011/05/19/20110519loughner-emails-pima-community-college-brk19-ON.html.
139. The shooting occurred on January 8, 2011. Loughner was sentenced on
November 8, 2012. See James Ball, Jared Lee Loughner Sentenced to Life in
Prison, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/gabrielle-giffords-confronts-shooter-jared-lee-loughner-incourt/2012/11/08/09968fe2-29c7-11e2-b4e0-346287b7e56c_story.html.
140. Hipolito Corella, Tucson Shooting Victims Face Loughner Before He Gets
Lifetime in Prison, ARIZONA DAILY STAR (Nov. 8, 2012, 10:01 AM), http://azstar
net.com/news/local/crime/tucson-shooting-victims-face-loughner-before-he-getslifetime-in/article_e234dff4-29c5-11e2-8c1d-0019bb2963f4.html; Michel Marizco,
Tucson Shooting Victims Satisfied with Loughner Plea Deal, FRONTERAS (Aug. 7,
2012), http://www.fronterasdesk.org/content/tucson-shooting-victims-satisfiedloughner-plea-deal; Tucson Gunman Faces Victims, Including Gabby Giffords,
Before Receiving Life Sentence, FOX NEWS (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.foxnews.
com/us/2012/11/08/tucson-gunman-faces-victims-including-gabby-giffords-during
-sentencing.
141. Giffords Husband to Loughner: ‘Gabby and I Are Done Thinking About
You,’ OZARKSFIRST (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.ozarksfirst.com/news/giffords-
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his sentencing hearing as a means to move forward as well.
For instance, a victim addressing Loughner stated, “You
pointed a weapon and shot me three times. . . . And now I
walked out of this courtroom and into the rest of my life and
I won’t think of you again.”142 Others were simply satisfied he
was in a place where he could no longer cause harm to
society.143 In sum, the effective prosecution and punishment
of the shooter in the Tucson case may have limited victims’
need to seek retribution through the tort system.
6. Aurora Victim Relief Fund
The State of Colorado and the Community First
Foundation established the Aurora Victim Relief Fund in
response to the July 20, 2012, mass shooting at a movie
theater in Aurora, Colorado, that left twelve dead and an
additional fifty-eight injured.144 The fund received over $5
million in donations, which were distributed via lump sum
payments.145 The fund’s compensation plan provided families
of the twelve deceased and five victims suffering from
permanent brain damage or paralysis with $220,000 each,
six victims who were hospitalized for more than twenty days
with $160,000 each, thirteen victims who were hospitalized
from one to seven days with $35,000 each, and two victims
who were hospitalized from eight to nineteen days with
$91,680 each.146 All victims were eligible for free counseling,

husband-to-loughner-gabby-and-i-are-done-thinking-about-you;
supra note 140.

see

Corella,

142. Jared Loughner Faces Tucson Rampage Victims, CBS (Nov. 8, 2012, 2:09
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57546836/jared-loughner-faces-tucs
on-rampage-victims.
143. See Corella, supra note 140.
144. See Ben Brumfield, Payments from Aurora Victim Relief Fund Finalized,
CNN (Nov. 18, 2012, 5:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/17/us/colorado-auro
ra-compensation/index.html. See generally Officials Release Complete List of
Injured Victims in Aurora Massacre, FOX NEWS (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.
foxnews.com/us/2013/01/10/officials-release-complete-list-injured-victims-inaurora-massacre.
145. Brumfield, supra note 144.
146. Id.
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and victims did not have to waive their right to sue in order
to access VCF funds.147
While victims ultimately received larger payments on
average from the Aurora Fund than for several other VCFs,
concerns over adequacy of compensation still appeared to be
a major factor driving post-event litigation. Initially, the fund
planned to disburse its resources to local non-profits who
would then provide services to the victims, similar to the
Columbine Healing Fund.148 This outraged victims, who went
public with their disapproval.149 Consequently, the fund
reevaluated its disbursement plan and decided to make lump
sum payments directly to victims.150 Nonetheless, by the time
the fund announced a new and final payment plan, victims
had already filed several lawsuits against the movie
theater,151 possibly out of concern about the original fund
disbursement plan. In total, at least twenty-two lawsuits
were filed in connection with the shooting.152
147. Id.; Ken Feinberg Announces Payment Plan for Aurora Theater Shooting
Victims, DENVER POST (Oct. 15, 2012, 9:43 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/
breakingnews/ci_21776275/ken-feinberg-announces-payment-plan-auroratheater-shooting.
148. CITY OF AURORA, 7/20 RECOVERY ADVISORY COMMITTEE CHRONOLOGY 1
(2012), https://www.auroragov.org/cs/groups/public/documents/document/012318
.pdf.
149. Oren Dorrell & Gary Strauss, Aurora Shooting Victims’ Families Upset
Over Relief Fund, USA TODAY (Aug. 28, 2012, 4:11 PM), http://usatoday30.usa
today.com/news/nation/story/2012-08-28/aurora-victim-families-speak/
57377450/1; Families of Aurora Shooting Victims Angry About Relief Fund, NBC
NEWS (Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.nbcnews.com/video/nightly-news/48818346
#48818346.
150. See Brumfield, supra note 144.
151. The following lawsuits were filed between July 27, 2012, when the initial
fund disbursement plan was announced, and October 15, 2012, when the new and
final payment plan was announced: See Complaint at ¶¶ 1-3, Jackson v.
Cinemark, USA, No. 1:12-CV-02704 (D. Colo. Oct. 11, 2012); Complaint at ¶¶ 1-3,
Medek v. Century Theaters, No. 1:12-CV-02705 (D. Colo. Oct. 11, 2012);
Complaint, Rosborough v. Cinemark, USA, No. 1:12-CV-02687 (D. Colo. Oct. 10,
2012); Complaint at ¶¶ 1-2, Nowlan v. Cinemark, USA, No.1:12-CV-02517
(D. Colo. Sept. 21, 2012); Complaint at ¶¶ 1-2, Traynom v. Cinemark, USA, No.
1:12-CV-02514 (D. Colo. Sept. 21, 2012).
152. See Axelrod v. Cinemark Holdings, Inc., No. 12-cv-02514-RBJ-MEH
(D. Colo. Aug. 15, 2014) (order denying summary judgment) (denying Cinemark’s
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7. Sandy Hook Community Foundation Fund
Following the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting
on December 14, 2012, United Way of Western Connecticut,
and Newtown Savings Bank created what was to become the
Sandy Hook School Support Fund.153 The fund received
$11,400,000 in donations and distributed it according to a
70-30 plan, where victims received 70% of the donations and
the remaining 30% went to the community.154 Of the 70%
distributed to victims, families of the twenty-six deceased
received $281,000, families of twelve children who witnessed
the massacre received $20,000, and two injured staff
members received $75,000.155 Where the remaining 30% is to
be allocated depends on the long-term needs of the
community.156
Controversy has swirled around the 70-30 plan. Victims
vented frustration over the plan at town hall meetings,
demanding more transparency and more input into the
fund’s administration.157 Some questioned why 30% of the
Fund’s proceeds were reserved for the community.158 With all

motion for summary judgment against collective plaintiffs in twenty consolidated
cases); see also Amended Complaint at ¶ 1, Phillips v. Lucky Gunner, No.
2014CV031946 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2014); Complaint at ¶¶ 7-13, Blunk v. Fenton,
No. 13-cv-00080 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2013).
153. See Newton-Sandy Hook Community Foundation, Inc. to Oversee Sandy
Hook School Support Fund, UNITED WAY W. CONN., http://www.uwwesternct.org/
sandyhook (last visited Dec. 19, 2013).
154. Id.; see also Tracy Connor & Tracy Jarrett, Newtown Residents Vent
Frustration at Meeting on Sandy Hook Fund Distribution, NBC NEWS (July 11,
2013, 11:08 PM), www.nbcnews.com/news/other/newtown-residents-ventfrustration-meeting-sandy-hook-fund-distribution-F6C10604182.
155. Plan Endorsed for Sandy Hook Community Foundation Distributions,
NEWTOWN BEE (July 17, 2013), http://www.newtownbee.com/news/2013/07/17/
plan-endorsed-sandy-hook-community-foundation-dist/150154.
156. See UNITED WAY W. CONN., supra note 153.
157. Connor & Jarrett, supra note 154.
158. Dave Altimari, Some Sandy Hook Victims’ Families Still Angry Over Fund,
HARTFORD COURANT (July 6, 2013), http://articles.courant.com/2013-07-06/
news/hc-sandyhook-families-unitedway-20130705_1_sandy-hook-victims-founda
tion-shooting-spree.
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of the controversy, however, litigation following the shooting
has been limited.
Roughly two years elapsed from the date of the shooting
before the first lawsuits. On December 15, 2014, victims
decided to sue the manufacturer and sellers of the gun used
in the shooting, a somewhat surprising strategy because
federal law makes it very difficult to sue gun manufactures
for their weapons used in illegal shootings.159 On December
14, 2014, victims also sued Newtown and its Board of
Education.160
There are a several potential explanations for the
lawsuits. First, compensation may be a factor given that
victims were not pleased with the Fund’s 70-30 distribution.
Second, victims may also desire to hold parties accountable
whom they feel are culpable, but who fall outside of the scope
of the criminal justice system. Because the shooter killed
himself and his mother—who was his caretaker and the
source of the weapon used—there has been no legal
accountability for those most directly involved in the tragedy.
8. One Fund Boston
In the wake of the bombing attack on the Boston
Marathon in 2013, various donors created the One Fund at
the behest of the city’s mayor and Massachusetts governor.161
In all, the One Fund collected an unprecedented $80 million
in donations.162 Almost all of the fund went directly to the
victims as lump sum payments.163 Like prior funds
distributing payments, the One Fund used a formula based
159. Pat Eaton-Robb & Dave Collins, Families of Newtown Victims Sue Rifle
Manufacturer, YAHOO NEWS (Dec. 15, 2014, 2:42 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/fam
ilies-newtown-victims-sue-gunmaker-seller-141435892.html.
160. Michele Richinick, Families Sue Newtown School Board, Town for
Children’s Deaths, MSNBC (Jan. 13, 2015, 1:11 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/ms
nbc/families-sue-newtown-school-board-town-childrens-deaths.
161. About the One Fund, ONE FUND, https://secure.onefundboston.org/pages/
about (last visited Dec. 19, 2013).
162. Id.
163. James Oliphant, How Much is a Life Worth?, NAT’L J. (Aug. 1, 2013),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/s/74873/how-much-is-life-worth?mref=scroll.
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on the extent of the injuries to determine payments. Families
of the four deceased and two double amputees received
$2,195,000 each.164 Fourteen victims who had one limb
amputated received $1,195,000 each.165 Depending on the
length of their stay in a hospital, 212 victims received
anywhere from $8000 to $948,000.166 Both in absolute terms
and relative to the number of victims, the One Fund
represents the largest and most generous private VCF that
has arisen following a mass attack to date.
Thus far, there has been little to no litigation
surrounding the Boston attack. Costs seem prohibitive, as
there appear to be no suitable targets for a lawsuit—the
suspect is likely judgment-proof and the Boston Athletic
Association, which manages the marathon, has its liability
capped.167 Government agencies, municipalities, and police
departments are likely immune as well.168 The fact that one
of the alleged perpetrators of the attack was killed, while the
other was seriously injured in the ensuing manhunt169 and
faces the death penalty,170 may diminish victims’ inclination
to turn to the tort system for accountability and retribution.
One issue cited in our survey that has begun to surface
among Boston victims is concern about whether the One
Fund compensation adequately covers future unforeseen
losses associated with the event. For example, some victims
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Martha Bebinger, No Clear Targets for Civil Suits in Marathon Bombings,
WBUR (May 10, 2013), http://www.wbur.org/2013/05/10/marathon-victims-law
suits; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85K (West 2015) (capping liability
of charitable organizations at $20,000 where a tort is “committed in the course of
any activity carried on to accomplish directly the charitable purposes of such
corporation”).
168. Bebinger, supra note 167.
169. Was Tamerlan Tsarnaev Schizophrenic? Boston Bomber Told Friends and
Family He ‘Had Two People Living in His Head’ Was the Victim of Mind Control,
DAILYMAIL (Dec. 16, 2013, 4:36 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-25
24891/Was-Boston-bomber-Tamerlan-Tsarnaev-schizophrenic.html.
170. Tara McKelvey, Boston in Shock Over Tsarnaev Death Penalty, BBC
(May 16, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32762999.
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who experienced symptoms of traumatic brain injury and
post-traumatic stress disorder several months after the event
have expressed concern that the One Fund calculations,
which were based upon the initial injury assessment, may
leave them undercompensated.171 Other amputees, who
received over a million dollars each from the fund, questioned
the adequacy of even that sum for their lifetime needs given
the cost of prosthetics, which can be quite expensive.172
Moreover, their employment prospects have diminished
significantly.173 As of this writing, the statute of limitations
on tort suits has not yet expired,174 so some victims might still
seek recovery.

171. Lenny Bernstein, Brain-Injured Woman and Others Seek More Money
From Fund for Boston Marathon Victims, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/brain-injured-woman-and-others-se
ek-more-money-from-fund-for-boston-marathon-victims/2013/10/02/84ebaa22-25
31-11e3-b75d-5b7f66349852_story_1.html.
172. Lenny Bernstein, For Some Boston Marathon Bombing Victims, Charity
Checks Bring Frustration, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2013), http://www.washington
post.com/national/health-science/for-some-boston-marathon-bombing-victims-ch
arity-checks-bring-frustration/2013/09/15/759bd786-1983-11e3-82ef-a059e54c49
d0_story.html.
173. Id.
174. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 2A (West 2000).
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Approximate
# of
# of victims recipients

Oklahoma
City
Community
Foundation
Disaster
Relief Fund

850

1033

Mile High
United Way
Healing Fund

40

38

Hokie Spirit
Memorial
Fund

50

AUSA Fort
Hood Fund

Total
funds
collected

Average
payment

$14,688,611

N/A1

1315

% of
fund
paid
# of
directly lawsuits
to
victims

50%

62

$4,600,000 $67,763.15

55%

17

79

$8,500,000

$108,000

100%

2

50

?

~$1,000,000

?

?

13

Tucson
Together
Fund

20

19

$522,264

NA4

100%

0

Aurora
Victims'
Relief Fund

80

33

$5,338,360 $161,768.48

100%

22

Sandy Hook
Community
Foundation
Fund

30

40

$11,600,000

70%

25

$192,400

One Fund
270
232
$70,500,000 $262,724.14
86%
0
Boston
Table 6: Summary of Recent VCFs Established Following Mass Injury Events
Notes:
1.
Fund disbursement was not direct lump sum payments. Instead, funds reimbursed
victims for their losses and supplemented other sources of support.
2.
At least two of the lawsuits were class actions involving approximately 300 plaintiffs.
3.
The sole lawsuit includes roughly 150 plaintiffs.
4.
Some compensation was provided as a lump sum payment directly to victims. Most
compensation received, however, reimbursed expenses.
5.
Nine families were represented in one lawsuit against manufacturers, and two in a
lawsuit against the school board.

Table 6 summarizes the funds reviewed above. As a
whole, the pattern of victim behavior observed following realworld events is in many ways consistent with the findings
from our survey. The Fort Hood event, which has engendered
no fund payouts thus far, and which has involved a lengthy
and controversial criminal justice process, might seem
particularly likely to foster follow-on litigation based on our
survey responses indicating that compensation and
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accountability are primary drivers of the decision to sue.
There have indeed been substantial amounts of litigation
since this event. Similarly, for both the Oklahoma City Fund
and the Mile High Fund, available funds were much lower on
a per-victim basis than for many of the later funds, and
ultimately there was an appreciable amount of post-event
litigation. For the Hokie Spirit Fund, the Sandy Hook Fund,
and One Fund, in contrast, there was more money available
on a per-victim basis and it was paid out quickly. Despite the
fact that victims did not need to waive their right to sue to
take money from these funds, post-event litigation has been
scant.
Perhaps the two funds that stand out as anomalies with
respect to the compensation/litigation pattern are the Tucson
fund—which had limited resources for compensation yet saw
no litigation—and the Aurora fund, which provided fairly
generous compensation on a per-person basis but still saw a
fair bit of litigation. However, in these cases other factors
cited in our survey seem to have been important moderators
of victim behavior. In the Tucson case, the perpetrator was
likely judgment-proof, which our survey suggests is a factor
citizens recognize and take into account when formulating
their decision to pursue a suit. The Tucson case also involved
a very high-profile victim, which may have altered behavior.
For Aurora, there was considerable initial uncertainty
regarding how the VCF would be administered; many of the
lawsuits there may have reflected victims’ efforts to manage
the uncertain possibility that they might receive no
compensation unless they filed a suit. Such uncertainty was
also consistently noted in our survey as a reason for pursuing
litigation.
Real-world victims also cited some purposes for litigation
that were not directly addressed by the survey. Families of a
number of victims in Oklahoma City and Columbine
expressed a desire to obtain answers about who precisely was
accountable, a motivation similar to that expressed by some
9/11 victims175 and some medical malpractice plaintiffs.176
Such motivations may have emerged in the survey had the
175. Hadfield, supra note 17, at 661-62.
176. Relis, supra note 36, at 365.
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vignette included more ambiguity about the circumstances
surrounding the injury.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis represents one of the first efforts to
empirically demonstrate how VCFs affect victims’
willingness to pursue litigation. What implications do our
results carry for policymakers, legal professionals, and the
public?
First, the tort system offers victims more than simply
compensation, and because of this, it is probably unrealistic
to expect VCFs to completely foreclose post-event litigation.
The experimental survey results suggested that roughly half
of adults would pursue litigation even when fully
compensated for economic loss. It seems reasonable to expect
that the actual number of suits among victims in a similar a
real-life situation could be lower—and our analysis of realworld funds suggests that this was indeed the case in some
previous tragedies—because potential claims would be
processed through the filter of the plaintiff’s bar.
Nevertheless, there appears to be considerable appetite for
litigation among even those who receive appreciable amounts
of compensation.
Our qualitative data explain this pattern by confirming
findings in previous studies that potential plaintiffs consider
the tort system to be a vehicle through which one can pursue
multiple objectives, including compensation, vindication,
policy change, retribution, access to information,
acknowledgement of harms, accountability, and insurance
against unforeseen future loss. While the insurance function
might in theory be incorporated into a VCF, it seems unlikely
that a VCF could ever serve many of these other functions of
tort. Moreover, our research comports with previous findings
that potential plaintiffs’ willingness to pursue or forego
litigation can be heavily influenced not only by compensation,
but also by these non-monetary litigation aims.
Second, the data nonetheless clearly suggest that VCFs
affect attitudes towards litigation, and that funds can reduce
victims’ inclination to use the tort system. If policymakers’
objective following a mass disaster is to allow those who are
injured to recover quickly without the need to resort to
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potentially lengthy, costly, and uncertain litigation, then
VCFs can provide an important tool to further that end.
Third, if there is a fund, decisions about how to structure
or administer it can influence future litigation. The survey
and real-world data suggest that one of the most important
fund characteristics, but which is typically outside of
policymakers’ control, is the total amount of compensation
available. However, for a given amount of resources, the data
do suggest particular approaches that may have greater
effects on tort litigation. Making small token payments to a
large number of people—which is normal in more
conventional consumer class actions—may not be an effective
strategy; our experimental survey data revealed that
litigation rates among those who received small payments
relative to their loss were similar to those who received no
payments at all. At the same time, VCFs do not necessarily
need to fully compensate individuals for economic or other
losses to affect litigation—victims are in many cases
conscious of the substantial emotional and in some cases
financial costs of pursuing litigation, and may be deterred
when fund payments close the gap between their loss and net
potential gains from litigation.
Both the survey and the real-world examples further
suggest that choices regarding the timing of the payments
can affect willingness to sue. Delaying payments too long,
which arguably occurred with the Oklahoma City Fund, the
Fort Hood Fund, and the Aurora Fund, can encourage
litigation. However, if payments are made too quickly, before
the full extent of event-related injuries manifest, our survey
responses indicate that some victims may resort to litigation
to address concerns about potential unforeseen future harms.
Taken together, the data suggest that funds may be most
successful at supplanting litigation in situations where there
are substantial amounts of money available in the fund, the
extent of injuries for victims is clear, responsibility for the
event is apparent, and the criminal justice process has high
legitimacy.
In instances of mass violence, VCFs often arise from
spontaneous feelings of sympathy and generosity among the
general public which leads them to make donations to assist
victims. In these situations, the establishment of a VCF is
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not necessarily the result of a specific policy decision. Our
results thus do not directly address situations such as 9/11 or
the Deepwater Horizon spill, where VCFs have been used as
a way to discourage lawsuits against one or more deeppocketed defendants for whom legal liability for a particular
set of harms was not fully certain. However, at the risk of
over-generalizing, one might also wish to consider whether
our results can provide any insights for potential defendants
who might be considering operating funds in such
circumstances.
First, there appear to be some important differences
across segments of the population in willingness to pursue
litigation following an injury. Although the precise reasons
for these differences remain obscure, this finding suggests a
VCF’s effects on litigation may, in part, depend on the target
population for the fund. Second, in our scenario, VCF
compensation reduced willingness to pursue litigation even
though VCF payments did not require a waiver of the right
to sue. This pattern suggests that VCFs may benefit potential
defendants even if payments are made without a waiver,
because some who are able to sue may decide not to do so once
they receive some amount of compensation.
Third, there appears to be a small segment of the
population who would not pursue a suit even without
compensation. If this pattern extends to the situation where
a corporate defendant establishes a VCF, then some of the
deterrent benefits of setting up a fund would be offset
because defendants would end up paying compensation to
some victims who would not have been compensated through
traditional tort mechanisms. Fourth, our data suggest that
where multiple potential tortfeasors are involved, the
presence or absence of a fund may not greatly impact victims’
allocation of blame across the different parties.
Although this analysis provides an important first step
in understanding how VCFs affect victim behavior, many
questions remain. One fruitful area for future study would be
to more carefully consider the breadth of situations across
which VCFs might provide an alternative to litigation. For
example, the Gulf Coast Claims Facility was established in
part based upon the belief that providing rapid compensation
to those affected by the Deepwater Horizon spill could
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eliminate future litigation and associated costs while still
providing injured parties a satisfactory resolution. It is
unclear at present whether a VCF can provide a viable
alternative to tort in such a situation. More generally, it
seems possible that VCFs could reduce litigation in more
traditional mass injury scenarios where corporations are
defendants, causality is more difficult to establish, and the
number of potential claimants is large. However, how much
a fund could impact behavior in such a situation—and
whether it could pass a cost-benefit test from the perspective
of a defendant—remains an open question. A related
question concerns whether the source of the money for a fund
matters—in the scenario we presented, the VCF was funded
through charitable donations, but in some cases, such as the
9/11 Fund and the Tucson Together Fund, VCF funds came
from governmental sources. It seems reasonable to imagine
that whether fund monies come from taxpayer dollars might
affect victim behavior, but at this point it is unclear whether
and how such effects operate.
Our analysis also does not address many important
procedural justice aspects of VCFs. For example, there are
many aspects of fund design, including how quickly
payments are made, what injury documentation is required,
whether hearings or other proceedings are held to allow
victims to express feelings regarding the fund, and whether
there is an appeals process, all of which likely affect whether
victims believe they are treated fairly by a fund, and thus
seem likely to ultimately affect their feelings about pursuing
litigation. Additional research seeking to better understand
the procedural justice aspects of VCFs is warranted.
Although there remains much to learn about what VCFs
can and cannot accomplish, what is apparent is that VCFs
are likely to remain an important component of the public
response to events of mass violence or injury. Policymakers
and legal scholars need to incorporate such programs and
their effects into how they think about compensation and
remedies following such tragedies.
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APPENDIX
A. Text of Survey
Imagine the following: During a large concert in a
stadium, a gunman in attendance opens fire on the crowd,
wounding and killing several dozen people before being
captured.
(Versions 3, 4, and, 5): After the shooting, a variety of
charitable
organizations,
individual
donors,
and
entertainment companies contribute money to a victims’
fund. The fund makes automatic payments to shooting
victims and their families based upon the severity of their
injuries.
Those harmed by the attack and their families could file
a lawsuit with the help of an attorney and seek injury
compensation. Suppose you were advising a loved one or
friend who had a total of $5,000 {$55,000} in wage and
medical losses from injuries in the shooting, (Versions 3, 4,
and 5): and who had received a $5,000 {$50,000} payment
from the victims’ fund.
Would you recommend they pursue a lawsuit?
__ Yes __ No

(If Yes) Who would you recommend they sue for their injuries
(check all that apply):
__ Gunman

__ Gun seller or manufacturer

__ Owner of the stadium

__ Security Company

__ Concert promoter or performers

__ Other

Please explain your answer regarding pursuing a lawsuit:
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Explanatory Variable
Survey Version

Coefficient

(reference: $5000 loss, no VCF)
$55,000 loss, no VCF
$5000 loss, $5000 VCF payment
$55,000 loss, $5000 VCF payment
$55,000 loss, $50,000 VCF payment
Female
U.S. citizen
Hispanic
Age (Years)
Age2
# in Household

-.014
(.110)
.012
(.129)
.075
(.112)
-.115
(.115)
-.230***
(.080)
-.108
(.257)
.128
(.116)
.031**
(.015)
.000
(.000)
-.022
(.027)

Employment Status
(reference: not working)
Employee

-.097
(.099)
-.202
(.163)
-.139
(.255)

Self-Employed
Other

Education
(reference: Less than HS)
High School Only
Some College, No Bachelor’s
Bachelor’s Degree
Advanced Degree

.302*
(.156)
.395**
(.161)
.424**
(.175)
.616***
(.193)
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Race
(reference: White)
African-American

.460***
(.124)
-.207
(.255)
.124
(.242)
.220
(.152)

Native-American
Asian-American
Other

Marital Status
(reference: married or living with a partner)
Separated

-.270
(.195)
.120
(.120)
.163
(.182)
-.002
(.109)

Divorced
Widowed
Never Married

Family Income
(reference: <$20K)
$20K–$40K
$40K–$75K
$75–$100K
>$100K
Constant
N
R2

.012
(.113)
.092
(.124)
-.043
(.149)
.179
(.159)
1.34***
(.495)
1165
.056

Table A1: Regression Estimates Relating Demographics to
Number of Parties Sued
Note: The table reports coefficients from a linear regression model where the outcome is
the number of parties sued (1–6) and the explanatory variables include demographic
characteristics of the respondents. The sample is limited to those who indicate that they
would sue. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
estimates that are statistically significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
confidence levels respectively.

